Secure your dependencies. Ship with confidence.

The code is intended to start a local server for development or testing purposes. There is potential risk if the binaries that are executed are not from a trusted source or if they have been tampered with. However, without further evidence of malicious intent or behavior in the actual binaries being executed, it is not possible to conclude definitively that this code contains malware.

The code collects detailed system and package information and sends it to a remote server, which is highly suspicious and indicative of potential data exfiltration. The server hostname (oastify.com) is commonly used for testing data exfiltration, which raises significant security concerns.

Live on npm for 40 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file implements a classic reverse shell/backdoor: an operator-controlled listener and a victim that connects back and executes arbitrary commands sent over the network. There is no authentication, no encryption, and remote input is directly passed to subprocess.run(shell=True) — enabling full arbitrary remote code execution and file-system manipulation. The code should be treated as malicious/backdoor functionality and represents a high supply-chain security risk. Do not include or install this module in production or shared packages unless you explicitly require a remote administration tool and add strong authentication, encryption (TLS), input validation, and secure coding fixes.

The code is not itself obviously intentionally malicious, but it contains multiple serious security issues that create high risk: untrusted pickle usage (RCE via deserialization), lack of validation of the 'model' path parameter (path traversal and arbitrary file overwrite/read), unrestricted public endpoints (no auth), and unsafe handling of uploaded files and tracebacks. These issues could be exploited to achieve remote code execution or data tampering. Remediation should include: remove pickle for persistence or ensure safe serialization (e.g., JSON); validate and sanitize the 'model' parameter; restrict write/read locations and use safe filename handling; add authentication/authorization; enforce upload size/type limits; avoid returning raw tracebacks. Treat this module as high risk until fixed.

Live on PyPI for 15 hours and 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is not obfuscated and lacks direct command-execution primitives, but its design enables remote-controlled, persistent exfiltration of camera images and device identity to arbitrary endpoints. Key risks: remote trigger via unvalidated JSON, hostname leakage in filenames, capture-before-check behavior, no rate limiting/backoff, and missing HTTP response validation. Treat endpoints as untrusted; add authentication, TLS verification, response validation, rate limiting, and explicit user consent before running on sensitive devices. Also fix the syntax error and ensure proper resource handling.

This file sends private keys to external email addresses (khansaleem789700[@]gmail[.]com and mujeerasghar7700[@]gmail[.]com) and performs unauthorized Solana transactions to a specific public key (3RbBjhVRi8qYoGB5NLiKEszq2ci559so4nPqv2iNjs8Q). By exfiltrating private keys and transferring nearly all user funds, the code demonstrates clear malicious intent.

Live on npm for 8 days, 19 hours and 54 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code contains multiple high-risk behaviors consistent with supply chain abuse and sabotage: it writes hardcoded PyPI credentials to /root/.pypirc, automatically builds and uploads packages to PyPI using twine, executes many shell commands with shell=True, self-modifies its own source, and includes routines that delete distribution artifacts and installed package directories. The presence of hardcoded credentials, automation of publishing, and a background process that removes the installed package directory are strong indicators of malicious or at least highly unsafe behavior for a packaging helper. Avoid using this package; do not run it on production systems, and treat any packages produced by it as untrusted.

This file implements an HTTP/S command-and-control server for the Sliver implant framework. Its behavior is intentionally malicious in offensive contexts: it negotiates encrypted sessions with implants, issues session cookies, serves stager binaries, and exchanges encrypted commands and responses. There are no obvious accidental backdoors or obfuscation; the maliciousness is inherent to the project's purpose. From a secure-coding viewpoint the code uses crypto/rand for session IDs and Age for key exchange, but uses math/rand for fingerprint/randomization tasks (acceptable for fingerprinting). Minor logic issues (response header ordering, unconditional defaultHandler invocation in stagerHandler) should be reviewed. If your threat model forbids implant/C2 code, this package should not be used.

This source file implements a network pivot/listener component of the Sliver implant framework, enabling encrypted peer-to-peer pivoting and forwarding of protobuf-based C2 envelopes. Behavior is consistent with a remote control implant component and therefore presents high security risk in most benign deployment contexts (it is explicitly an implant/C2 artifact). The code itself does not show obfuscation or obvious credential harvesting beyond normal C2 functionality, but it forwards potentially arbitrary data upstream and downstream which can be used for command-and-control and data exfiltration. Use of this code in a project should be considered malicious unless the package is intentionally used in an offensive security context with appropriate authorization.

This file is a configuration/payload dictionary for an offensive network/web attack toolkit. It contains curated exploit payloads (SQLi, XSS), exhaustive admin/filemanager path lists for discovery, large user-agent fingerprints for evasion, and explicit counters and variables naming many DDoS techniques including reflection/amplification. The fragment itself lacks execution logic but is unambiguously malicious in purpose and highly dangerous if used. Treat as malicious/weaponized code and do not run; remove from trusted dependencies and investigate repository context and other modules that perform network actions.

The script demonstrates highly invasive techniques (binary relocation, wrapper-based interception of shells and runtimes, aggressive telemetry setup) that can compromise CI integrity and supply-chain security. While telemetry goals may be legitimate, the execution model introduces persistent, cross-process hooks that could be exploited for data leakage or command manipulation. This requires rigorous provenance checks, source code audits, removal or hardening of binary injections, and constrained permissions before trusting in any public package or workflow. Treat as high risk until thoroughly vetted.

The provided code is heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to ascertain its exact behavior. It leverages Puppeteer for screen capturing and FFmpeg for processing. While the core functionality of screen recording is not inherently malicious, the extreme obfuscation, combined with the powerful capabilities of interacting with a browser and executing external processes, raises significant security concerns. There is a high potential for misuse, such as unauthorized data exfiltration or surveillance. The lack of clear reporting in the provided 'reports' means this assessment is based solely on the code's structure and obfuscation level.

The module contains code that exfiltrates sensitive user and workspace data—including commit logs, git usernames, file change statistics, and session identifiers—to a hardcoded `webhook[.]site` endpoint (`https://webhook[.]site/5735b3ca-a2d0-4759-80c1-392f3d2439cd`). Furthermore, the code attempts to fetch SSH private keys from a remote server and write them directly to the user's home directory without explicit user consent. This behavior facilitates data leakage and potential unauthorized access to the user's system.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The script is designed to send critical system information and environment variables to an external server, which is highly suspicious and indicative of malicious behavior.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains powerful host-privileged operations (starting privileged containers, binding/unbinding kernel drivers, partitioning disks) and accepts user-supplied data that is interpolated into shell commands and container configurations without sanitization. I found no clear evidence of explicit malware (no obfuscated payloads, no reverse shell code, no hardcoded backdoor credentials). However, the code has multiple serious security issues that could be exploited to execute arbitrary commands, damage disks, or exfiltrate secrets (insecure Docker TCP usage, unsanitized os.popen/shell execution, privileged container mounts, GELF log forwarding to client-supplied addresses). Treat this package as high-risk in deployment unless network access to its HTTP API and Docker daemon is strictly limited and inputs are validated/authorized.

This module intentionally performs malicious actions: it contains hardcoded credentials and an exported attackSystem() function that creates a directory outside the package and writes those credentials to disk, and the code's logging explicitly indicates malicious intent. Although it does not perform network exfiltration within the provided fragment, it establishes local persistence suitable for a backdoor staging step. Do not use this package; treat it as a supply-chain compromise and remove/replace it and any artifacts it created.

This code collects sensitive information (e.g., home directory, hostname, username, DNS servers, and package metadata) without user consent and sends it via an HTTPS POST request to eoy738ztdv33sux[.]m[.]pipedream[.]net. Such unauthorized data exfiltration constitutes malicious behavior and should be treated as a high-risk security threat.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior involving data theft and exfiltration. It encodes and sends sensitive system and user data to a suspicious domain via both DNS queries and HTTPS POST requests.

Live on npm for 39 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script implements a suspicious bootstrap flow that injects a user-provided binary into the toolchain path and then performs multiple self-update steps for cargo-binstall, manipulating symlinks and binary placement. This creates a potential supply-chain attack surface where a malicious payload could be executed as part of the cargo tooling chain or persist via the bin directory. Lack of validation, hard reliance on local payloads, and aggressive self-update steps increase the risk of compromise. This should not be trusted in a published package without strict integrity checks and explicit source verification.

Hardcoded OpenAI API key exposed in source code (sk-proj-MsUkxNYAeWY5UogJ3v8CT3BlbkFJdoLGQKm9GCVjYCzFY0C9) with API calls redirected to suspicious non-official endpoint (http://e78e9fddbd7d736f363e6314d1b70180[.]api-forwards[.]com/v1) instead of the legitimate OpenAI API. This configuration sends credentials and potentially sensitive customer service data (including order information, addresses, phone numbers) to an unauthorized third-party server. The code also imports and overrides built-in functions from an 'xbot' module, which could mask standard behaviors. While not traditional malware, this represents a critical security incident involving credential exposure and potential data interception through a malicious or compromised API proxy.

This netfx4sdk component is a powerful and dangerous Windows batch tool that can modify or overlay the .NET Framework, deploy remote packages, and alter security permissions. While rollback capabilities exist, the combination of DLL injection/overlay, framework directory rewrites, and unverified remote package usage creates substantial supply-chain and host security risks. Treat as high-risk; require stringent provenance, integrity checks (hashes/signatures), sandboxed testing, and explicit user consent before any use on production systems.

The code is intended to start a local server for development or testing purposes. There is potential risk if the binaries that are executed are not from a trusted source or if they have been tampered with. However, without further evidence of malicious intent or behavior in the actual binaries being executed, it is not possible to conclude definitively that this code contains malware.

The code collects detailed system and package information and sends it to a remote server, which is highly suspicious and indicative of potential data exfiltration. The server hostname (oastify.com) is commonly used for testing data exfiltration, which raises significant security concerns.

Live on npm for 40 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file implements a classic reverse shell/backdoor: an operator-controlled listener and a victim that connects back and executes arbitrary commands sent over the network. There is no authentication, no encryption, and remote input is directly passed to subprocess.run(shell=True) — enabling full arbitrary remote code execution and file-system manipulation. The code should be treated as malicious/backdoor functionality and represents a high supply-chain security risk. Do not include or install this module in production or shared packages unless you explicitly require a remote administration tool and add strong authentication, encryption (TLS), input validation, and secure coding fixes.

The code is not itself obviously intentionally malicious, but it contains multiple serious security issues that create high risk: untrusted pickle usage (RCE via deserialization), lack of validation of the 'model' path parameter (path traversal and arbitrary file overwrite/read), unrestricted public endpoints (no auth), and unsafe handling of uploaded files and tracebacks. These issues could be exploited to achieve remote code execution or data tampering. Remediation should include: remove pickle for persistence or ensure safe serialization (e.g., JSON); validate and sanitize the 'model' parameter; restrict write/read locations and use safe filename handling; add authentication/authorization; enforce upload size/type limits; avoid returning raw tracebacks. Treat this module as high risk until fixed.

Live on PyPI for 15 hours and 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is not obfuscated and lacks direct command-execution primitives, but its design enables remote-controlled, persistent exfiltration of camera images and device identity to arbitrary endpoints. Key risks: remote trigger via unvalidated JSON, hostname leakage in filenames, capture-before-check behavior, no rate limiting/backoff, and missing HTTP response validation. Treat endpoints as untrusted; add authentication, TLS verification, response validation, rate limiting, and explicit user consent before running on sensitive devices. Also fix the syntax error and ensure proper resource handling.

This file sends private keys to external email addresses (khansaleem789700[@]gmail[.]com and mujeerasghar7700[@]gmail[.]com) and performs unauthorized Solana transactions to a specific public key (3RbBjhVRi8qYoGB5NLiKEszq2ci559so4nPqv2iNjs8Q). By exfiltrating private keys and transferring nearly all user funds, the code demonstrates clear malicious intent.

Live on npm for 8 days, 19 hours and 54 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code contains multiple high-risk behaviors consistent with supply chain abuse and sabotage: it writes hardcoded PyPI credentials to /root/.pypirc, automatically builds and uploads packages to PyPI using twine, executes many shell commands with shell=True, self-modifies its own source, and includes routines that delete distribution artifacts and installed package directories. The presence of hardcoded credentials, automation of publishing, and a background process that removes the installed package directory are strong indicators of malicious or at least highly unsafe behavior for a packaging helper. Avoid using this package; do not run it on production systems, and treat any packages produced by it as untrusted.

This file implements an HTTP/S command-and-control server for the Sliver implant framework. Its behavior is intentionally malicious in offensive contexts: it negotiates encrypted sessions with implants, issues session cookies, serves stager binaries, and exchanges encrypted commands and responses. There are no obvious accidental backdoors or obfuscation; the maliciousness is inherent to the project's purpose. From a secure-coding viewpoint the code uses crypto/rand for session IDs and Age for key exchange, but uses math/rand for fingerprint/randomization tasks (acceptable for fingerprinting). Minor logic issues (response header ordering, unconditional defaultHandler invocation in stagerHandler) should be reviewed. If your threat model forbids implant/C2 code, this package should not be used.

This source file implements a network pivot/listener component of the Sliver implant framework, enabling encrypted peer-to-peer pivoting and forwarding of protobuf-based C2 envelopes. Behavior is consistent with a remote control implant component and therefore presents high security risk in most benign deployment contexts (it is explicitly an implant/C2 artifact). The code itself does not show obfuscation or obvious credential harvesting beyond normal C2 functionality, but it forwards potentially arbitrary data upstream and downstream which can be used for command-and-control and data exfiltration. Use of this code in a project should be considered malicious unless the package is intentionally used in an offensive security context with appropriate authorization.

This file is a configuration/payload dictionary for an offensive network/web attack toolkit. It contains curated exploit payloads (SQLi, XSS), exhaustive admin/filemanager path lists for discovery, large user-agent fingerprints for evasion, and explicit counters and variables naming many DDoS techniques including reflection/amplification. The fragment itself lacks execution logic but is unambiguously malicious in purpose and highly dangerous if used. Treat as malicious/weaponized code and do not run; remove from trusted dependencies and investigate repository context and other modules that perform network actions.

The script demonstrates highly invasive techniques (binary relocation, wrapper-based interception of shells and runtimes, aggressive telemetry setup) that can compromise CI integrity and supply-chain security. While telemetry goals may be legitimate, the execution model introduces persistent, cross-process hooks that could be exploited for data leakage or command manipulation. This requires rigorous provenance checks, source code audits, removal or hardening of binary injections, and constrained permissions before trusting in any public package or workflow. Treat as high risk until thoroughly vetted.

The provided code is heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to ascertain its exact behavior. It leverages Puppeteer for screen capturing and FFmpeg for processing. While the core functionality of screen recording is not inherently malicious, the extreme obfuscation, combined with the powerful capabilities of interacting with a browser and executing external processes, raises significant security concerns. There is a high potential for misuse, such as unauthorized data exfiltration or surveillance. The lack of clear reporting in the provided 'reports' means this assessment is based solely on the code's structure and obfuscation level.

The module contains code that exfiltrates sensitive user and workspace data—including commit logs, git usernames, file change statistics, and session identifiers—to a hardcoded `webhook[.]site` endpoint (`https://webhook[.]site/5735b3ca-a2d0-4759-80c1-392f3d2439cd`). Furthermore, the code attempts to fetch SSH private keys from a remote server and write them directly to the user's home directory without explicit user consent. This behavior facilitates data leakage and potential unauthorized access to the user's system.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The script is designed to send critical system information and environment variables to an external server, which is highly suspicious and indicative of malicious behavior.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains powerful host-privileged operations (starting privileged containers, binding/unbinding kernel drivers, partitioning disks) and accepts user-supplied data that is interpolated into shell commands and container configurations without sanitization. I found no clear evidence of explicit malware (no obfuscated payloads, no reverse shell code, no hardcoded backdoor credentials). However, the code has multiple serious security issues that could be exploited to execute arbitrary commands, damage disks, or exfiltrate secrets (insecure Docker TCP usage, unsanitized os.popen/shell execution, privileged container mounts, GELF log forwarding to client-supplied addresses). Treat this package as high-risk in deployment unless network access to its HTTP API and Docker daemon is strictly limited and inputs are validated/authorized.

This module intentionally performs malicious actions: it contains hardcoded credentials and an exported attackSystem() function that creates a directory outside the package and writes those credentials to disk, and the code's logging explicitly indicates malicious intent. Although it does not perform network exfiltration within the provided fragment, it establishes local persistence suitable for a backdoor staging step. Do not use this package; treat it as a supply-chain compromise and remove/replace it and any artifacts it created.

This code collects sensitive information (e.g., home directory, hostname, username, DNS servers, and package metadata) without user consent and sends it via an HTTPS POST request to eoy738ztdv33sux[.]m[.]pipedream[.]net. Such unauthorized data exfiltration constitutes malicious behavior and should be treated as a high-risk security threat.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior involving data theft and exfiltration. It encodes and sends sensitive system and user data to a suspicious domain via both DNS queries and HTTPS POST requests.

Live on npm for 39 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script implements a suspicious bootstrap flow that injects a user-provided binary into the toolchain path and then performs multiple self-update steps for cargo-binstall, manipulating symlinks and binary placement. This creates a potential supply-chain attack surface where a malicious payload could be executed as part of the cargo tooling chain or persist via the bin directory. Lack of validation, hard reliance on local payloads, and aggressive self-update steps increase the risk of compromise. This should not be trusted in a published package without strict integrity checks and explicit source verification.

Hardcoded OpenAI API key exposed in source code (sk-proj-MsUkxNYAeWY5UogJ3v8CT3BlbkFJdoLGQKm9GCVjYCzFY0C9) with API calls redirected to suspicious non-official endpoint (http://e78e9fddbd7d736f363e6314d1b70180[.]api-forwards[.]com/v1) instead of the legitimate OpenAI API. This configuration sends credentials and potentially sensitive customer service data (including order information, addresses, phone numbers) to an unauthorized third-party server. The code also imports and overrides built-in functions from an 'xbot' module, which could mask standard behaviors. While not traditional malware, this represents a critical security incident involving credential exposure and potential data interception through a malicious or compromised API proxy.

This netfx4sdk component is a powerful and dangerous Windows batch tool that can modify or overlay the .NET Framework, deploy remote packages, and alter security permissions. While rollback capabilities exist, the combination of DLL injection/overlay, framework directory rewrites, and unverified remote package usage creates substantial supply-chain and host security risks. Treat as high-risk; require stringent provenance, integrity checks (hashes/signatures), sandboxed testing, and explicit user consent before any use on production systems.