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This file is a web shell / malicious file-manager backdoor. It exposes unrestricted filesystem read/write/delete, file upload, permission changes, and server info disclosure, all controllable via HTTP parameters. The use of extract() on request data and lack of authentication make it trivial for an attacker to upload a PHP web shell or overwrite critical files and to delete large parts of the filesystem. Do not deploy; treat as compromise artifact, remove immediately, and investigate attacker access.

The provided code is largely the SweetAlert2 UI library, but contains a clearly malicious/abusive snippet that targets visitors with Russian locales and hosts in Russian TLDs. That snippet persists a timestamp in localStorage and (after >3 days) disables user interaction on the page and attempts to autoplay an externally hosted audio file (Ukrainian anthem) — a targeted, disruptive action. This is malicious and inappropriate for a third-party dependency. I recommend not using this package version and treating it as a supply-chain compromise or intentional sabotage; replace it with a clean, audited version from a trusted source or pin to a known-good commit.

This manifest declares a crate whose intended purpose is to perform TCP SYN flood attacks (a denial-of-service tool). The file itself contains only metadata and no executable code, so it does not show code-level malware patterns, but the package's stated functionality is malicious/abusive by design and poses a high security risk if used. Recommend treating this package as potentially harmful and avoid including it in projects unless you explicitly require such functionality and understand legal/ethical implications.

The snippet exfiltrates potentially sensitive environment data to an external Redis instance using a hardcoded credentialized URL and unfiltered process.env dump. This constitutes a severe security risk and potential backdoor-like data leakage. Recommendations include removing hardcoded credentials, avoiding dumping process.env wholesale, implementing explicit data minimization, and configuring secure, auditable deployment processes.

The code poses a significant security risk and should be reviewed. It is recommended to remove unnecessary imports, verify the contents of the data folder and the WordPress websites before proceeding, and avoid using hardcoded credentials for WordPress login.

Live on npm for 27 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a deliberate destructive utility that corrupts all .zip files in a specified directory by truncating each archive to half its size and appending repeated junk data. While it lacks common malware features like networking or data exfiltration, the behavior is strongly indicative of sabotage and would be unacceptable in most software supply-chain contexts due to its potential to break builds, deployments, or artifact integrity.

This file is malicious: it actively searches the filesystem and environment for secrets (specifically tokens matching HTB{...}), enumerates network and processes, and exfiltrates collected data to an external webhook (webhook.site). It also tries to inject a crafted manifest via HTTP PUT to local services. This behavior is data-theft / espionage and possibly an exploitation/post-compromise tool. Do not run or include this module in production. Remediate by removing the package, rotating any exposed secrets, and investigating hosts where this ran.

This code is a browser fingerprinting library (collecting canvas, WebGL, audio, font, DOM, and many other signals) to compute a visitorId. It is not exhibiting classic malware behaviors (no remote shells, no credential leaks to arbitrary endpoints, no system command execution). However it is privacy-invasive by design: it builds a persistent identifier from many device/browser signals and performs hidden DOM/audio/canvas measurements. The only network activity visible is an occasional telemetry GET to an openfpcdn.io monitoring path; the fragment does not show exfiltration of collected fingerprint components. If you are evaluating for supply-chain safety: the module is not malware but it poses significant privacy/tracking risk and should be treated accordingly in contexts where fingerprinting is unacceptable.

The fragment exhibits high-risk indicators: heavily obfuscated/packed payload blocks embedded with numerous external-endpoint references, suggesting potential remote code loading, data exfiltration, or covert configuration fetched at runtime. The visible AuthService methods themselves align with normal patterns, but the surrounding content warrants immediate containment, deep static/dynamic analysis, and likely removal from production builds until proven benign. Recommend isolating, auditing, or replacing with a clean, well-documented implementation.

This module intentionally performs high-risk operations: installing user-specified packages, staging and uploading local code, and executing the agent module in-process. If the provided agent code or requirements are untrusted, they can execute arbitrary actions (data access, exfiltration, spawning processes, network calls). The code is not itself obfuscated or clearly malicious, but it provides functionality that can be abused as a supply-chain or remote-execution vector. Recommendations: only run this with trusted agent code and vetted requirements; avoid executing untrusted modules in-process; consider performing static checks, running the agent code inside a strongly isolated sandbox/container, and preventing upload of sensitive files beyond the explicit excludes.

This code exhibits multiple clear malicious behaviors: it fetches remote payloads (over HTTP and via curl), hides targets via base64, executes remote code directly (curl ... | zsh) and runs downloaded executables on Windows, attempts to escalate to administrator privileges, and posts telemetry to attacker-controlled endpoints. It matches a dropper/backdoor pattern and should be treated as malicious and high risk. Do not run this code; if observed in a dependency, remove and investigate.

Live on pypi for 6 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The JSON is an explicit catalog of attack payloads and modern WAF evasion techniques. It contains many payloads that would enable data exfiltration, server-side command execution (SSTI, PHP system), SSRF via DNS rebinding, XSS, and client-side WASM exploitation. As content, it is offensive in nature and poses a high security risk if executed or used against systems without authorization. It should only be stored and used in controlled, authorized testing environments and not included in production dependencies or shipped to untrusted environments.

The script does not exhibit malicious intent, but it poses significant security risks due to the lack of validation and verification steps, open network bindings, and potential command injection vulnerabilities. It is recommended to add checksum verification for downloaded binaries, validate and sanitize environment variables, and restrict network access to the services.

The code downloads and executes a remote script from a fixed external URL and passes sensitive inputs (authToken and repository context) as command-line arguments. This creates a high-risk supply-chain and runtime threat: remote code execution, potential credential exposure, and lack of integrity verification. It should be considered unsafe in secure environments. Mitigations include removing remote execution, embedding necessary logic securely, using signed artifacts, and avoiding tokens in command-line arguments. If remote execution cannot be eliminated, implement stringent integrity checks, input validation/escaping, isolated execution, and minimize exposure of secrets.

The code exhibits high-risk behavior by dynamically loading and executing remote scripts from hardcoded IP addresses, enabling arbitrary code execution from potentially malicious servers. This is a strong indicator of malicious intent or a severe supply chain security risk. The code is not heavily obfuscated but uses simple shuffling and repeated IPs to select the remote source. It should be considered malicious and avoided or removed from any software supply chain.

The script performs various system-level operations including process killing, network checking, logging, and extensive registry modifications, some of which disable crash reporting and configure system reboots. It also includes an external script for automatic execution. These operations indicate a high potential for misuse or malicious intent, particularly in disabling error reporting and forcing system reboots. Without more context, these actions pose significant security risks.

This module functions as a high-fidelity interaction capture component: it globally listens for keyboard and form/input-related events, captures e.key and input values (with minimal truncation rather than redaction), enriches events with DOM text and computed XPath identifiers, and sends all data to a Chrome extension via runtime messaging, along with page URL/title. While no external networking is shown here, the collected data types are highly sensitive and the behavior strongly aligns with keylogging/form-data harvesting use cases. The receiving extension logic and declared permissions should be reviewed urgently for consent, scope, minimization, and any external exfiltration.

The code presents potential security risks due to the handling of sensitive information and the transmission of encrypted data to an external server. The function 'exports.hello' is particularly concerning as it logs and sends potentially sensitive data, which could lead to data leakage or unauthorized access.

The code exhibits several security risks, particularly in the sendEmail function which could lead to data exfiltration. The presence of hardcoded values and lack of input validation raises concerns about potential malicious behavior. Overall, the code should be reviewed and modified to mitigate these risks.

Live on pypi for 4 hours and 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Best matching report: Report 3 (most complete and correctly identifies the disruption/uninstall pattern). The improved assessment is that this snippet is a high-impact, unguarded teardown script that deletes systemd unit definitions and application configuration, removes specific network interfaces, and stops/removes containers and persistent Docker volumes. That strongly endangers availability and data integrity in a supply-chain context, but the fragment alone does not prove credential theft/exfiltration; therefore malware intent is not certain, though security risk is very high.

The code presents several potential security risks and suggests the intent of managing a C2 server, which could be used for malicious purposes. Specifically, the handling of subprocesses with shell=True, the lack of proper input validation, and the exposure of sensitive file operations could facilitate unauthorized actions and access to sensitive data. Therefore, this code should be treated with caution and likely indicates malicious intent in its context.

[Skill Scanner] Instruction to copy/paste content into terminal detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Instruction to copy/paste content into terminal detected (CI012) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] The workflow and helper-script approach accomplish the intended conversion goal but include multiple supply-chain and operational security concerns: unpinned npx usage (automatic remote code execution), substitution and persistence of environment-variable secrets to disk without secure handling, and explicit guidance to execute commands directly without prior confirmation. These make accidental or intentional secret exposure and unintended network actions more likely. I do not see explicit malicious code in the provided material, but prior to running this workflow in sensitive environments you should: (1) inspect and pin the mcp-to-skill package and its dependencies, (2) review the exact exec-with-env.sh implementation for unsafe shell usage or exfiltration, (3) avoid writing plaintext secrets to persistent locations (use in-memory substitution or secure temporary files and immediately scrub), (4) prefer an explicit confirmation step before executing tool commands that may contact external endpoints, and (5) run generation/execution in an isolated environment or CI with limited privileges. LLM verification: This skill performs functionality that is consistent with converting MCP configs into agent skills, but it carries non-trivial supply-chain and secret-exfiltration risks. Major concerns: use of npx -y (un pinned, auto-download-and-execute), the design to resolve and inject host environment variables into generated configs and then directly execute external tools, and the explicit guidance to 'execute directly' without user confirmation. Without seeing exec-with-env.sh content, it's impossible to

This script intentionally creates pickle files containing nested pickled objects that will execute a callable when unpickled (via a __reduce__ implementation). It demonstrates a known dangerous pattern: embedding executable serialized objects inside seemingly legitimate artifacts (raw bytes, base64, hex, multi-stage). The generator itself performs only local file writes and does not execute harmful system commands here, but the produced artifacts are dangerous: unpickling them (or decoding embedded strings and unpickling/executing them) leads to arbitrary code execution. Treat files produced by this script as malicious attack samples; do not unpickle them in untrusted contexts.

The provided source code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior, including data exfiltration and connecting to suspicious domains. The actions taken by the code pose a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is a web shell / malicious file-manager backdoor. It exposes unrestricted filesystem read/write/delete, file upload, permission changes, and server info disclosure, all controllable via HTTP parameters. The use of extract() on request data and lack of authentication make it trivial for an attacker to upload a PHP web shell or overwrite critical files and to delete large parts of the filesystem. Do not deploy; treat as compromise artifact, remove immediately, and investigate attacker access.

The provided code is largely the SweetAlert2 UI library, but contains a clearly malicious/abusive snippet that targets visitors with Russian locales and hosts in Russian TLDs. That snippet persists a timestamp in localStorage and (after >3 days) disables user interaction on the page and attempts to autoplay an externally hosted audio file (Ukrainian anthem) — a targeted, disruptive action. This is malicious and inappropriate for a third-party dependency. I recommend not using this package version and treating it as a supply-chain compromise or intentional sabotage; replace it with a clean, audited version from a trusted source or pin to a known-good commit.

This manifest declares a crate whose intended purpose is to perform TCP SYN flood attacks (a denial-of-service tool). The file itself contains only metadata and no executable code, so it does not show code-level malware patterns, but the package's stated functionality is malicious/abusive by design and poses a high security risk if used. Recommend treating this package as potentially harmful and avoid including it in projects unless you explicitly require such functionality and understand legal/ethical implications.

The snippet exfiltrates potentially sensitive environment data to an external Redis instance using a hardcoded credentialized URL and unfiltered process.env dump. This constitutes a severe security risk and potential backdoor-like data leakage. Recommendations include removing hardcoded credentials, avoiding dumping process.env wholesale, implementing explicit data minimization, and configuring secure, auditable deployment processes.

The code poses a significant security risk and should be reviewed. It is recommended to remove unnecessary imports, verify the contents of the data folder and the WordPress websites before proceeding, and avoid using hardcoded credentials for WordPress login.

Live on npm for 27 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a deliberate destructive utility that corrupts all .zip files in a specified directory by truncating each archive to half its size and appending repeated junk data. While it lacks common malware features like networking or data exfiltration, the behavior is strongly indicative of sabotage and would be unacceptable in most software supply-chain contexts due to its potential to break builds, deployments, or artifact integrity.

This file is malicious: it actively searches the filesystem and environment for secrets (specifically tokens matching HTB{...}), enumerates network and processes, and exfiltrates collected data to an external webhook (webhook.site). It also tries to inject a crafted manifest via HTTP PUT to local services. This behavior is data-theft / espionage and possibly an exploitation/post-compromise tool. Do not run or include this module in production. Remediate by removing the package, rotating any exposed secrets, and investigating hosts where this ran.

This code is a browser fingerprinting library (collecting canvas, WebGL, audio, font, DOM, and many other signals) to compute a visitorId. It is not exhibiting classic malware behaviors (no remote shells, no credential leaks to arbitrary endpoints, no system command execution). However it is privacy-invasive by design: it builds a persistent identifier from many device/browser signals and performs hidden DOM/audio/canvas measurements. The only network activity visible is an occasional telemetry GET to an openfpcdn.io monitoring path; the fragment does not show exfiltration of collected fingerprint components. If you are evaluating for supply-chain safety: the module is not malware but it poses significant privacy/tracking risk and should be treated accordingly in contexts where fingerprinting is unacceptable.

The fragment exhibits high-risk indicators: heavily obfuscated/packed payload blocks embedded with numerous external-endpoint references, suggesting potential remote code loading, data exfiltration, or covert configuration fetched at runtime. The visible AuthService methods themselves align with normal patterns, but the surrounding content warrants immediate containment, deep static/dynamic analysis, and likely removal from production builds until proven benign. Recommend isolating, auditing, or replacing with a clean, well-documented implementation.

This module intentionally performs high-risk operations: installing user-specified packages, staging and uploading local code, and executing the agent module in-process. If the provided agent code or requirements are untrusted, they can execute arbitrary actions (data access, exfiltration, spawning processes, network calls). The code is not itself obfuscated or clearly malicious, but it provides functionality that can be abused as a supply-chain or remote-execution vector. Recommendations: only run this with trusted agent code and vetted requirements; avoid executing untrusted modules in-process; consider performing static checks, running the agent code inside a strongly isolated sandbox/container, and preventing upload of sensitive files beyond the explicit excludes.

This code exhibits multiple clear malicious behaviors: it fetches remote payloads (over HTTP and via curl), hides targets via base64, executes remote code directly (curl ... | zsh) and runs downloaded executables on Windows, attempts to escalate to administrator privileges, and posts telemetry to attacker-controlled endpoints. It matches a dropper/backdoor pattern and should be treated as malicious and high risk. Do not run this code; if observed in a dependency, remove and investigate.

Live on pypi for 6 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The JSON is an explicit catalog of attack payloads and modern WAF evasion techniques. It contains many payloads that would enable data exfiltration, server-side command execution (SSTI, PHP system), SSRF via DNS rebinding, XSS, and client-side WASM exploitation. As content, it is offensive in nature and poses a high security risk if executed or used against systems without authorization. It should only be stored and used in controlled, authorized testing environments and not included in production dependencies or shipped to untrusted environments.

The script does not exhibit malicious intent, but it poses significant security risks due to the lack of validation and verification steps, open network bindings, and potential command injection vulnerabilities. It is recommended to add checksum verification for downloaded binaries, validate and sanitize environment variables, and restrict network access to the services.

The code downloads and executes a remote script from a fixed external URL and passes sensitive inputs (authToken and repository context) as command-line arguments. This creates a high-risk supply-chain and runtime threat: remote code execution, potential credential exposure, and lack of integrity verification. It should be considered unsafe in secure environments. Mitigations include removing remote execution, embedding necessary logic securely, using signed artifacts, and avoiding tokens in command-line arguments. If remote execution cannot be eliminated, implement stringent integrity checks, input validation/escaping, isolated execution, and minimize exposure of secrets.

The code exhibits high-risk behavior by dynamically loading and executing remote scripts from hardcoded IP addresses, enabling arbitrary code execution from potentially malicious servers. This is a strong indicator of malicious intent or a severe supply chain security risk. The code is not heavily obfuscated but uses simple shuffling and repeated IPs to select the remote source. It should be considered malicious and avoided or removed from any software supply chain.

The script performs various system-level operations including process killing, network checking, logging, and extensive registry modifications, some of which disable crash reporting and configure system reboots. It also includes an external script for automatic execution. These operations indicate a high potential for misuse or malicious intent, particularly in disabling error reporting and forcing system reboots. Without more context, these actions pose significant security risks.

This module functions as a high-fidelity interaction capture component: it globally listens for keyboard and form/input-related events, captures e.key and input values (with minimal truncation rather than redaction), enriches events with DOM text and computed XPath identifiers, and sends all data to a Chrome extension via runtime messaging, along with page URL/title. While no external networking is shown here, the collected data types are highly sensitive and the behavior strongly aligns with keylogging/form-data harvesting use cases. The receiving extension logic and declared permissions should be reviewed urgently for consent, scope, minimization, and any external exfiltration.

The code presents potential security risks due to the handling of sensitive information and the transmission of encrypted data to an external server. The function 'exports.hello' is particularly concerning as it logs and sends potentially sensitive data, which could lead to data leakage or unauthorized access.

The code exhibits several security risks, particularly in the sendEmail function which could lead to data exfiltration. The presence of hardcoded values and lack of input validation raises concerns about potential malicious behavior. Overall, the code should be reviewed and modified to mitigate these risks.

Live on pypi for 4 hours and 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Best matching report: Report 3 (most complete and correctly identifies the disruption/uninstall pattern). The improved assessment is that this snippet is a high-impact, unguarded teardown script that deletes systemd unit definitions and application configuration, removes specific network interfaces, and stops/removes containers and persistent Docker volumes. That strongly endangers availability and data integrity in a supply-chain context, but the fragment alone does not prove credential theft/exfiltration; therefore malware intent is not certain, though security risk is very high.

The code presents several potential security risks and suggests the intent of managing a C2 server, which could be used for malicious purposes. Specifically, the handling of subprocesses with shell=True, the lack of proper input validation, and the exposure of sensitive file operations could facilitate unauthorized actions and access to sensitive data. Therefore, this code should be treated with caution and likely indicates malicious intent in its context.

[Skill Scanner] Instruction to copy/paste content into terminal detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Instruction to copy/paste content into terminal detected (CI012) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] The workflow and helper-script approach accomplish the intended conversion goal but include multiple supply-chain and operational security concerns: unpinned npx usage (automatic remote code execution), substitution and persistence of environment-variable secrets to disk without secure handling, and explicit guidance to execute commands directly without prior confirmation. These make accidental or intentional secret exposure and unintended network actions more likely. I do not see explicit malicious code in the provided material, but prior to running this workflow in sensitive environments you should: (1) inspect and pin the mcp-to-skill package and its dependencies, (2) review the exact exec-with-env.sh implementation for unsafe shell usage or exfiltration, (3) avoid writing plaintext secrets to persistent locations (use in-memory substitution or secure temporary files and immediately scrub), (4) prefer an explicit confirmation step before executing tool commands that may contact external endpoints, and (5) run generation/execution in an isolated environment or CI with limited privileges. LLM verification: This skill performs functionality that is consistent with converting MCP configs into agent skills, but it carries non-trivial supply-chain and secret-exfiltration risks. Major concerns: use of npx -y (un pinned, auto-download-and-execute), the design to resolve and inject host environment variables into generated configs and then directly execute external tools, and the explicit guidance to 'execute directly' without user confirmation. Without seeing exec-with-env.sh content, it's impossible to

This script intentionally creates pickle files containing nested pickled objects that will execute a callable when unpickled (via a __reduce__ implementation). It demonstrates a known dangerous pattern: embedding executable serialized objects inside seemingly legitimate artifacts (raw bytes, base64, hex, multi-stage). The generator itself performs only local file writes and does not execute harmful system commands here, but the produced artifacts are dangerous: unpickling them (or decoding embedded strings and unpickling/executing them) leads to arbitrary code execution. Treat files produced by this script as malicious attack samples; do not unpickle them in untrusted contexts.

The provided source code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior, including data exfiltration and connecting to suspicious domains. The actions taken by the code pose a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.