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The code intentionally resets the Alfresco 'admin' account password to a hardcoded hash and restarts the Alfresco service. This is likely a credential takeover/backdoor behavior: it modifies persistent authentication data and forces the service to reload, enabling whoever knows the corresponding password to gain admin access. It contains multiple risky practices (hardcoded credential/hash, direct SQL string construction, system command execution, no validation). Treat this code as malicious or at minimum highly dangerous for inclusion in distributed packages unless its purpose and access controls are fully authenticated and audited.

The code is designed to exfiltrate system information by sending it to an external domain via DNS queries. This is a clear indication of malicious behavior, as it involves unauthorized data transmission without user consent.

Live on npm for 2 hours and 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The module implements aggressive license enforcement that performs external validation and persists state locally but also includes a destructive selfDestruct routine that deletes the package directory and exits the process if validation fails or cannot be confirmed outside a grace period. It transmits local data (project path and hostname) and the license key to a default external activation endpoint. This behavior represents a significant supply-chain and privacy risk: it can exfiltrate environment information and cause destructive modifications to installed files. Treat this package as high-risk: remove or replace it unless its presence and behavior are explicitly expected and trusted within your environment, and restrict environment variables that enable activation.

This script makes a network request to an external server, which could potentially be used for data exfiltration or to confirm the execution of the script. This behavior is considered suspicious and poses a security risk.

Live on npm for 11 hours and 32 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script is malicious and functions as an automated exfiltration tool for Telegram session data: it locates Telegram/Ayugram 'tdata' directories, archives selected small files (likely session/authentication material), and uploads the archive to a hardcoded Telegram bot/chat ID before attempting to remove traces. Do not run this code. If it has executed on a host, treat the host as compromised: revoke Telegram sessions/credentials, rotate passwords and keys, inspect network logs for contacts with Telegram Bot API, and perform host forensic analysis.

During the uninstall process the script reads stored identifiers (uniqueId, userId, sessionId, deviceId) from telemetry.json (fallback to a generated ID using os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username) and gathers environment details (OS platform, extensionVersion, timestamp). It then constructs an “extension_uninstalled” event and sends it via a PostHog client configured with a hardcoded project key (phc_i6BYW9WOl9cUl3jKL0Pyv5OuoqlKj1Gv97jF72irfrq) to https://us[.]i[.]posthog[.]com. There is no visible opt-in or consent mechanism, and the process exits immediately after transmitting the data. This behavior constitutes unsolicited telemetry exfiltration and poses a privacy risk.

This script reads the content of the /etc/hosts file, encodes it and sends it to a remote server, which can be considered a security risk.

Live on npm for 12 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code is highly suspicious and effectively malicious: it orchestrates serving phishing templates locally and exposing them publicly via an SSH reverse tunnel, and references storage of harvested IPs and credentials. It also uses unsafe shell execution with unescaped, user-supplied values, creating command-injection risk. Treat this package as hostile; do not run it in production or on any machine that contains or can access sensitive data.

This code is highly suspicious and should not be used without further investigation. The code is heavily obfuscated and could potentially contain malicious code. The purpose of the code is unclear and further investigation is necessary to determine its exact behavior.

Live on npm for 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment exhibits high-risk behavior due to dynamic code execution via eval of an obfuscated payload, along with environment-derived HTTP communications and multiple layers of indirection. This aligns with potential backdoor or remote-control capabilities and possible data exfiltration telemetry. Although some components might be legitimate API wrappers, the combination of eval on a decoded string and heavy obfuscation constitutes a significant security risk and warrants removal or a rigorous code review, strict deobfuscation controls, and explicit disclosure of intended behavior before usage in any project.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

This file contains multiple high-risk behaviors consistent with malicious supply-chain and persistence actions: hardcoded PyPI credentials, self-modifying source, decrypting and executing payloads from disk, creating and executing temporary scripts, removing its own file, and killing parent processes. It appears designed to manipulate packaging/publishing workflows and to hide or execute additional payloads. Treat as malicious and do not run in a trusted environment.

This file implements direct exfiltration paths: it collects caller-supplied token/URL and identity/IP/keys and POSTs them to a hardcoded, unusual remote host. The behavior is high-risk for supply-chain data leakage. The code quality issues (unused import, runtime typo) increase suspicion. Treat this package as potentially malicious or at least untrusted until the external endpoint and the package's provenance are verified. Do not use in sensitive environments; remove or replace with a version that exposes configurable, auditable endpoints and avoids sending secrets without explicit user control.

The code is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system and project data to external servers, indicating malicious intent. It poses a significant security risk due to unauthorized data transmission.

Live on npm for 3 hours and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a repository of explicit, ready-to-use client-side exfiltration payloads (XSS) targeting cookies, clipboard, geolocation, and media devices, all directing sensitive data to a hardcoded external host (evil.com). Inclusion of this file in general-purpose code or templates constitutes a high security risk: accidental reflection or reuse can produce immediate client-side data leaks. Treat this as malicious/objectionable content for production contexts; retain only in tightly controlled testing environments with strict isolation and audit. Remove, sanitize, or parameterize payloads (and avoid hardcoded exfiltration domains) before reuse.

The analyzed code embeds a hardcoded private key and static wallet metadata, enabling signing (and potential broadcasting) of Nano transactions from a wallet not controlled by the end user. This creates a severe backdoor-like risk in a supply-chain context: published code could sign and autorotate transfers without explicit user consent or proper key management. Immediate remediation is required: remove hardcoded credentials, derive keys from secure user-controlled wallets, enforce explicit user approval for transactions, validate all inputs, and complete or remove NotImplemented surfaces to avoid partial exposure. Final assessment: high security risk and malware potential due to embedded credentials and misuse potential.

The code contains some suspicious elements, especially the hardcoded GitHub repository URL with a personal access token and the execution of shell commands. While the primary functionality appears to be legitimate (interacting with textpro.me to generate images), these elements raise security concerns that warrant further investigation.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

This code implements an automated mechanism to transmit local installation logs to a single, hard-coded external host using an embedded private SSH key and disabled host verification. That combination provides a high-confidence, high-severity supply-chain/backdoor pattern enabling data exfiltration. Even if intended as legitimate telemetry, the implementation is insecure: remove hard-coded credentials, require explicit interactive consent or strong configuration gating, enable host key verification, sanitize/redact logs, and avoid writing private keys into source or ephemeral disk. Immediate remediation is recommended.

The code contains multiple high-risk dynamic execution patterns that allow server-supplied data to execute arbitrary JavaScript on the client (via eval and dynamic import from a data URI). This constitutes a serious supply-chain-like risk for a front-end package: if any endpoint or event can supply javascript_code or payloads, an attacker could run arbitrary code in the user's browser. Absent strong sanitization or sandboxing, this is a security vulnerability and potential backdoor risk.

Possible `1-step D-L dist` typosquat of [colorama](https://socket.dev/pypi/package/colorama) Explanation: The package name 'coloramoo' differs from 'colorama' by a single character (an appended 'o'), which qualifies it as a minor modification that could deceive users. The naming change fits the definition of adversarial naming due to its near-identical appearance. There is no indication that this package is a fork (e.g., no username or namespace hinting at a derivative work) and its functionality is not distinct from the legitimate package. Additionally, the description is a nonsensical string that raises suspicion, further supporting the likelihood of typosquatting. Risk level: High).

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

This module performs immediate, unauthorized collection and transmission of local environment and package metadata to an attacker-controlled ngrok-like endpoint. Behavior matches data-exfiltration/backdoor patterns in supply-chain compromises. Treat the package as malicious/untrusted: remove or isolate it, revoke any credentials that may have been exposed, and investigate systems where it was installed.

The code is highly suspicious due to its obfuscation and the collection and transmission of environment variables to an external server. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration, posing a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The source code is a malicious reverse shell implementation that establishes a persistent remote shell connection to a suspicious domain. It poses a critical security risk and should be treated as malware. Immediate removal and blocking of this code/package is strongly recommended.

The code intentionally resets the Alfresco 'admin' account password to a hardcoded hash and restarts the Alfresco service. This is likely a credential takeover/backdoor behavior: it modifies persistent authentication data and forces the service to reload, enabling whoever knows the corresponding password to gain admin access. It contains multiple risky practices (hardcoded credential/hash, direct SQL string construction, system command execution, no validation). Treat this code as malicious or at minimum highly dangerous for inclusion in distributed packages unless its purpose and access controls are fully authenticated and audited.

The code is designed to exfiltrate system information by sending it to an external domain via DNS queries. This is a clear indication of malicious behavior, as it involves unauthorized data transmission without user consent.

Live on npm for 2 hours and 34 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The module implements aggressive license enforcement that performs external validation and persists state locally but also includes a destructive selfDestruct routine that deletes the package directory and exits the process if validation fails or cannot be confirmed outside a grace period. It transmits local data (project path and hostname) and the license key to a default external activation endpoint. This behavior represents a significant supply-chain and privacy risk: it can exfiltrate environment information and cause destructive modifications to installed files. Treat this package as high-risk: remove or replace it unless its presence and behavior are explicitly expected and trusted within your environment, and restrict environment variables that enable activation.

This script makes a network request to an external server, which could potentially be used for data exfiltration or to confirm the execution of the script. This behavior is considered suspicious and poses a security risk.

Live on npm for 11 hours and 32 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script is malicious and functions as an automated exfiltration tool for Telegram session data: it locates Telegram/Ayugram 'tdata' directories, archives selected small files (likely session/authentication material), and uploads the archive to a hardcoded Telegram bot/chat ID before attempting to remove traces. Do not run this code. If it has executed on a host, treat the host as compromised: revoke Telegram sessions/credentials, rotate passwords and keys, inspect network logs for contacts with Telegram Bot API, and perform host forensic analysis.

During the uninstall process the script reads stored identifiers (uniqueId, userId, sessionId, deviceId) from telemetry.json (fallback to a generated ID using os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username) and gathers environment details (OS platform, extensionVersion, timestamp). It then constructs an “extension_uninstalled” event and sends it via a PostHog client configured with a hardcoded project key (phc_i6BYW9WOl9cUl3jKL0Pyv5OuoqlKj1Gv97jF72irfrq) to https://us[.]i[.]posthog[.]com. There is no visible opt-in or consent mechanism, and the process exits immediately after transmitting the data. This behavior constitutes unsolicited telemetry exfiltration and poses a privacy risk.

This script reads the content of the /etc/hosts file, encodes it and sends it to a remote server, which can be considered a security risk.

Live on npm for 12 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code is highly suspicious and effectively malicious: it orchestrates serving phishing templates locally and exposing them publicly via an SSH reverse tunnel, and references storage of harvested IPs and credentials. It also uses unsafe shell execution with unescaped, user-supplied values, creating command-injection risk. Treat this package as hostile; do not run it in production or on any machine that contains or can access sensitive data.

This code is highly suspicious and should not be used without further investigation. The code is heavily obfuscated and could potentially contain malicious code. The purpose of the code is unclear and further investigation is necessary to determine its exact behavior.

Live on npm for 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment exhibits high-risk behavior due to dynamic code execution via eval of an obfuscated payload, along with environment-derived HTTP communications and multiple layers of indirection. This aligns with potential backdoor or remote-control capabilities and possible data exfiltration telemetry. Although some components might be legitimate API wrappers, the combination of eval on a decoded string and heavy obfuscation constitutes a significant security risk and warrants removal or a rigorous code review, strict deobfuscation controls, and explicit disclosure of intended behavior before usage in any project.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

This file contains multiple high-risk behaviors consistent with malicious supply-chain and persistence actions: hardcoded PyPI credentials, self-modifying source, decrypting and executing payloads from disk, creating and executing temporary scripts, removing its own file, and killing parent processes. It appears designed to manipulate packaging/publishing workflows and to hide or execute additional payloads. Treat as malicious and do not run in a trusted environment.

This file implements direct exfiltration paths: it collects caller-supplied token/URL and identity/IP/keys and POSTs them to a hardcoded, unusual remote host. The behavior is high-risk for supply-chain data leakage. The code quality issues (unused import, runtime typo) increase suspicion. Treat this package as potentially malicious or at least untrusted until the external endpoint and the package's provenance are verified. Do not use in sensitive environments; remove or replace with a version that exposes configurable, auditable endpoints and avoids sending secrets without explicit user control.

The code is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system and project data to external servers, indicating malicious intent. It poses a significant security risk due to unauthorized data transmission.

Live on npm for 3 hours and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a repository of explicit, ready-to-use client-side exfiltration payloads (XSS) targeting cookies, clipboard, geolocation, and media devices, all directing sensitive data to a hardcoded external host (evil.com). Inclusion of this file in general-purpose code or templates constitutes a high security risk: accidental reflection or reuse can produce immediate client-side data leaks. Treat this as malicious/objectionable content for production contexts; retain only in tightly controlled testing environments with strict isolation and audit. Remove, sanitize, or parameterize payloads (and avoid hardcoded exfiltration domains) before reuse.

The analyzed code embeds a hardcoded private key and static wallet metadata, enabling signing (and potential broadcasting) of Nano transactions from a wallet not controlled by the end user. This creates a severe backdoor-like risk in a supply-chain context: published code could sign and autorotate transfers without explicit user consent or proper key management. Immediate remediation is required: remove hardcoded credentials, derive keys from secure user-controlled wallets, enforce explicit user approval for transactions, validate all inputs, and complete or remove NotImplemented surfaces to avoid partial exposure. Final assessment: high security risk and malware potential due to embedded credentials and misuse potential.

The code contains some suspicious elements, especially the hardcoded GitHub repository URL with a personal access token and the execution of shell commands. While the primary functionality appears to be legitimate (interacting with textpro.me to generate images), these elements raise security concerns that warrant further investigation.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

This code implements an automated mechanism to transmit local installation logs to a single, hard-coded external host using an embedded private SSH key and disabled host verification. That combination provides a high-confidence, high-severity supply-chain/backdoor pattern enabling data exfiltration. Even if intended as legitimate telemetry, the implementation is insecure: remove hard-coded credentials, require explicit interactive consent or strong configuration gating, enable host key verification, sanitize/redact logs, and avoid writing private keys into source or ephemeral disk. Immediate remediation is recommended.

The code contains multiple high-risk dynamic execution patterns that allow server-supplied data to execute arbitrary JavaScript on the client (via eval and dynamic import from a data URI). This constitutes a serious supply-chain-like risk for a front-end package: if any endpoint or event can supply javascript_code or payloads, an attacker could run arbitrary code in the user's browser. Absent strong sanitization or sandboxing, this is a security vulnerability and potential backdoor risk.

Possible `1-step D-L dist` typosquat of [colorama](https://socket.dev/pypi/package/colorama) Explanation: The package name 'coloramoo' differs from 'colorama' by a single character (an appended 'o'), which qualifies it as a minor modification that could deceive users. The naming change fits the definition of adversarial naming due to its near-identical appearance. There is no indication that this package is a fork (e.g., no username or namespace hinting at a derivative work) and its functionality is not distinct from the legitimate package. Additionally, the description is a nonsensical string that raises suspicion, further supporting the likelihood of typosquatting. Risk level: High).

This module implements privileged node and device management and exposes HTTP endpoints that accept user input used directly in shell commands and Docker operations. Main risks: command injection (unsanitized string interpolation into shell commands and os.popen), destructive device operations (partitioning, bind/unbind), supplying arbitrary images to be pulled and run as privileged containers, and use of an unencrypted/unprotected Docker TCP socket (tcp://...:2375). I assess this as not manifestly malware but a high-risk administrative component that must be strictly access-controlled and hardened (validate/sanitize inputs, avoid passing raw user values into shell/Docker operations, use secure Docker API access, avoid exposing endpoints publicly).

This module performs immediate, unauthorized collection and transmission of local environment and package metadata to an attacker-controlled ngrok-like endpoint. Behavior matches data-exfiltration/backdoor patterns in supply-chain compromises. Treat the package as malicious/untrusted: remove or isolate it, revoke any credentials that may have been exposed, and investigate systems where it was installed.

The code is highly suspicious due to its obfuscation and the collection and transmission of environment variables to an external server. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration, posing a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The source code is a malicious reverse shell implementation that establishes a persistent remote shell connection to a suspicious domain. It poses a critical security risk and should be treated as malware. Immediate removal and blocking of this code/package is strongly recommended.