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This source file implements a network pivot/listener component of the Sliver implant framework, enabling encrypted peer-to-peer pivoting and forwarding of protobuf-based C2 envelopes. Behavior is consistent with a remote control implant component and therefore presents high security risk in most benign deployment contexts (it is explicitly an implant/C2 artifact). The code itself does not show obfuscation or obvious credential harvesting beyond normal C2 functionality, but it forwards potentially arbitrary data upstream and downstream which can be used for command-and-control and data exfiltration. Use of this code in a project should be considered malicious unless the package is intentionally used in an offensive security context with appropriate authorization.

Cannot perform security analysis due to heavily obfuscated/corrupted source code and incomplete security report. The extreme level of obfuscation itself is a major red flag indicating potential malicious content.

[Skill Scanner] Backtick command substitution detected The skill description is purpose-aligned and internally coherent: it describes building reusable Hugging Face API tooling with appropriate authentication guidance, reference implementations, and composable patterns. There are no malicious patterns detected in the provided content, and the data flow is limited to legitimate API access and local script orchestration. Security risk is present primarily in how tokens are used (environment variable) and should be mitigated by ensuring proper logging/privacy in real implementations. LLM verification: The skill fragment appears benign with respect to purpose, execution flow, and data handling. The main risk areas are standard credential hygiene and avoiding leakage of HF_TOKEN in logs or shell history. The documented backtick example is a documentation artifact rather than active code. Implementers should sanitize inputs and ensure credentials are not logged. Overall footprint aligns with the goal of Hugging Face API tool building.

This code performs extensive host fingerprinting (OS details, hostname, username, homedir, shell, memory, CPU, screen resolution, process enumeration, locale, TTY status) and immediately exfiltrates the collected data over a raw TCP connection to a hardcoded remote host (8.152.163.60:8058). The combination of obfuscated identifiers, immediate side-effectful execution, synchronous shell invocations, and silent network error handling strongly indicate malicious reconnaissance/exfiltration behavior (spyware/backdoor). Treat the module as malicious: do not run, remove from deployments, and investigate any systems that may have executed it.

Live on npm for 9 hours and 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly obfuscated and performs actions that are indicative of potentially malicious behavior, such as downloading and executing files based on the operating system. The use of network requests and interaction with a smart contract further increases the risk. Caution is advised when dealing with this code.

This module zips a local directory and uploads it to a specific S3 bucket. The code contains hardcoded AWS credentials and a hardcoded bucket name, which is a severe security issue and could enable data exfiltration if these credentials are valid. There are additional problems: a likely return-value bug (undefined variable s3_ke), possible insufficient path-safety around symlinks, and verbose logging of paths. There is no evidence of obfuscation or active payloads like reverse shells or eval-based code execution. Treat this package as high-risk until credentials are removed/rotated and the code is corrected and reviewed.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 10 hours and 49 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

There is no clear evidence of deliberately malicious code in this file, but it contains multiple high-risk patterns that can easily be abused: executing arbitrary AI-generated shell commands with shell=True, missing safety checks (is_command_safe imported but unused), excessive automatic retries, and inconsistent API key handling. These make the module a significant security risk in practice and susceptible to supply-chain or AI-manipulation attacks. Treat this package as potentially dangerous until proper validation, confirmation, and sandboxing are implemented.

Live on PyPI for 3 hours and 44 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is dangerous and should not be used. The file downloaded from the external source should be verified and validated before being executed, and errors and exceptions should be handled properly.

Live on npm for 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script is a supply-chain backdoor that self-executes on load: it recursively walks /tmp/supplysec and /tmp (up to 1,200 files, 120 KB per file), filters for text files, extracts matches of the HTB{...} pattern along with file snippets and directory listings, and bundles them with the npm_package_resolved environment variable into a JSON payload. It then silently exfiltrates this data via HTTP(S) POST to the hardcoded endpoint https://webhook[.]site/9abfee18-babc-4a9d-ae66-1b82ed6f436c without authentication, user consent, or opt-out. Remove any installations immediately and audit affected systems for possible leakage of sensitive data.

The code in the flagged file explicitly reads a local file from a fixed system path (/home/joben/Desktop/testsol/abstract_it.py) and transmits its contents via an HTTP request to a Discord webhook. The target URL is hardcoded as https://discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/1278595755812327424/3xvzS30Bx8bOhooNJeY9gnYj2KjFb2-ZfV2rHpBdkS71tuibNeu56_mRFE38MrmQRa_j, with the embedded token included in the URL. This behavior is characteristic of malware designed for data exfiltration, as it automatically sends potentially sensitive file content to an external service without user consent.

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] The fragment presents a coherent, purpose-aligned citation-management workflow with appropriate use of public bibliographic APIs and BibTeX tooling. The primary concern is compliance and reliability when automating Google Scholar. For a production-grade, low-risk release, implement API-first workflows (CrossRef, PubMed, arXiv) by default, and make Google Scholar automation optional with explicit terms-of-service compliance, rate-limiting, and clear user consent. Ensure credential handling is explicit, and add sandboxed execution for external calls with robust input validation. LLM verification: The documentation and examples match the declared citation-management purpose. No explicit malicious behavior is visible in the provided content. The primary security concerns are supply-chain risks from multiple unpinned pip dependencies and increased attack surface from web scraping (Selenium/scholarly) which can access browser state and rely on third-party HTML. I recommend pinning dependencies, adding integrity checks, documenting browser and driver setup, and advising users about scraping-r

This code collects local traceback and project source files and sends them to an external LLM API, then may overwrite local files with returned code. That is a high-risk pattern: it enables exfiltration of potentially sensitive code and automatic remote-controlled modifications to the filesystem (code injection / supply-chain risk). Even if intended for convenience, deployed in production or on developer machines containing secrets, it poses a strong security and privacy hazard. I assess this as likely malicious or at minimum dangerously insecure and unsuitable for use without significant safeguards (explicit consent, file allowlists, secret redaction, and manual review before writing files).

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This file creates a persistent reverse shell connection to example[.]com on port 43197, allowing remote command execution and potential data exfiltration. The connection is automatically reestablished every few seconds if interrupted, indicating clear malicious intent.

The preinstall hook runs a local bundled JavaScript file during npm install. By itself this is not proof of malware, but it is a high-risk operation because it executes code with the installer's privileges. You should inspect the contents of dist/index.esm.js (or block preinstall scripts) before installing, verify the package source and integrity, and avoid installing in sensitive environments until the file is reviewed.

Live on npm for 4 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code poses a serious security risk and should not be used.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 16 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Legitimate database operation module with a critical code injection vulnerability. The direct execution of user-provided map-reduce operators without validation poses significant security risk, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution on the MongoDB server.

Live on npm for 1 day and 37 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This source file implements a network pivot/listener component of the Sliver implant framework, enabling encrypted peer-to-peer pivoting and forwarding of protobuf-based C2 envelopes. Behavior is consistent with a remote control implant component and therefore presents high security risk in most benign deployment contexts (it is explicitly an implant/C2 artifact). The code itself does not show obfuscation or obvious credential harvesting beyond normal C2 functionality, but it forwards potentially arbitrary data upstream and downstream which can be used for command-and-control and data exfiltration. Use of this code in a project should be considered malicious unless the package is intentionally used in an offensive security context with appropriate authorization.

This script silently collects the host machine's hostname (via os.hostname()) and an optional project identifier (from process.argv[2], defaulting to "unknown"), packages them into a JSON string, URL-encodes the result, and issues an HTTPS GET request to https://z0[.]rs/callback?msg=<payload>. It explicitly disables TLS certificate validation (rejectUnauthorized:false) and suppresses errors, enabling transmission of system information without user notification or consent. The disabled TLS verification exposes the data to potential man-in-the-middle interception. While the data collected is limited to hostname and project ID, this constitutes unauthorized telemetry that operates without user awareness or consent.

Live on npm for 9 days, 12 hours and 40 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script is designed to send potentially sensitive information to a remote server, which poses a significant security risk and indicates malicious behavior.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

The code is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system information to an external domain without user consent, indicating malicious intent. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 2 hours and 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The module is a thin wrapper that exposes dangerous sinks (os.system and requests.get) and delegates to an opaque third-party module (danielutils). The file itself does not contain explicit malicious payloads, obfuscation, or hardcoded secrets, but it materially increases risk by providing direct access to shell execution and network requests, and by relying on an external, unreviewed dependency. Recommend auditing the danielutils package and any call sites that use these wrappers; avoid passing untrusted input to os_system and ensure requests.get usage does not leak sensitive data.

This source file implements a network pivot/listener component of the Sliver implant framework, enabling encrypted peer-to-peer pivoting and forwarding of protobuf-based C2 envelopes. Behavior is consistent with a remote control implant component and therefore presents high security risk in most benign deployment contexts (it is explicitly an implant/C2 artifact). The code itself does not show obfuscation or obvious credential harvesting beyond normal C2 functionality, but it forwards potentially arbitrary data upstream and downstream which can be used for command-and-control and data exfiltration. Use of this code in a project should be considered malicious unless the package is intentionally used in an offensive security context with appropriate authorization.

Cannot perform security analysis due to heavily obfuscated/corrupted source code and incomplete security report. The extreme level of obfuscation itself is a major red flag indicating potential malicious content.

[Skill Scanner] Backtick command substitution detected The skill description is purpose-aligned and internally coherent: it describes building reusable Hugging Face API tooling with appropriate authentication guidance, reference implementations, and composable patterns. There are no malicious patterns detected in the provided content, and the data flow is limited to legitimate API access and local script orchestration. Security risk is present primarily in how tokens are used (environment variable) and should be mitigated by ensuring proper logging/privacy in real implementations. LLM verification: The skill fragment appears benign with respect to purpose, execution flow, and data handling. The main risk areas are standard credential hygiene and avoiding leakage of HF_TOKEN in logs or shell history. The documented backtick example is a documentation artifact rather than active code. Implementers should sanitize inputs and ensure credentials are not logged. Overall footprint aligns with the goal of Hugging Face API tool building.

This code performs extensive host fingerprinting (OS details, hostname, username, homedir, shell, memory, CPU, screen resolution, process enumeration, locale, TTY status) and immediately exfiltrates the collected data over a raw TCP connection to a hardcoded remote host (8.152.163.60:8058). The combination of obfuscated identifiers, immediate side-effectful execution, synchronous shell invocations, and silent network error handling strongly indicate malicious reconnaissance/exfiltration behavior (spyware/backdoor). Treat the module as malicious: do not run, remove from deployments, and investigate any systems that may have executed it.

Live on npm for 9 hours and 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly obfuscated and performs actions that are indicative of potentially malicious behavior, such as downloading and executing files based on the operating system. The use of network requests and interaction with a smart contract further increases the risk. Caution is advised when dealing with this code.

This module zips a local directory and uploads it to a specific S3 bucket. The code contains hardcoded AWS credentials and a hardcoded bucket name, which is a severe security issue and could enable data exfiltration if these credentials are valid. There are additional problems: a likely return-value bug (undefined variable s3_ke), possible insufficient path-safety around symlinks, and verbose logging of paths. There is no evidence of obfuscation or active payloads like reverse shells or eval-based code execution. Treat this package as high-risk until credentials are removed/rotated and the code is corrected and reviewed.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 10 hours and 49 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

There is no clear evidence of deliberately malicious code in this file, but it contains multiple high-risk patterns that can easily be abused: executing arbitrary AI-generated shell commands with shell=True, missing safety checks (is_command_safe imported but unused), excessive automatic retries, and inconsistent API key handling. These make the module a significant security risk in practice and susceptible to supply-chain or AI-manipulation attacks. Treat this package as potentially dangerous until proper validation, confirmation, and sandboxing are implemented.

Live on PyPI for 3 hours and 44 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is dangerous and should not be used. The file downloaded from the external source should be verified and validated before being executed, and errors and exceptions should be handled properly.

Live on npm for 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script is a supply-chain backdoor that self-executes on load: it recursively walks /tmp/supplysec and /tmp (up to 1,200 files, 120 KB per file), filters for text files, extracts matches of the HTB{...} pattern along with file snippets and directory listings, and bundles them with the npm_package_resolved environment variable into a JSON payload. It then silently exfiltrates this data via HTTP(S) POST to the hardcoded endpoint https://webhook[.]site/9abfee18-babc-4a9d-ae66-1b82ed6f436c without authentication, user consent, or opt-out. Remove any installations immediately and audit affected systems for possible leakage of sensitive data.

The code in the flagged file explicitly reads a local file from a fixed system path (/home/joben/Desktop/testsol/abstract_it.py) and transmits its contents via an HTTP request to a Discord webhook. The target URL is hardcoded as https://discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/1278595755812327424/3xvzS30Bx8bOhooNJeY9gnYj2KjFb2-ZfV2rHpBdkS71tuibNeu56_mRFE38MrmQRa_j, with the embedded token included in the URL. This behavior is characteristic of malware designed for data exfiltration, as it automatically sends potentially sensitive file content to an external service without user consent.

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] The fragment presents a coherent, purpose-aligned citation-management workflow with appropriate use of public bibliographic APIs and BibTeX tooling. The primary concern is compliance and reliability when automating Google Scholar. For a production-grade, low-risk release, implement API-first workflows (CrossRef, PubMed, arXiv) by default, and make Google Scholar automation optional with explicit terms-of-service compliance, rate-limiting, and clear user consent. Ensure credential handling is explicit, and add sandboxed execution for external calls with robust input validation. LLM verification: The documentation and examples match the declared citation-management purpose. No explicit malicious behavior is visible in the provided content. The primary security concerns are supply-chain risks from multiple unpinned pip dependencies and increased attack surface from web scraping (Selenium/scholarly) which can access browser state and rely on third-party HTML. I recommend pinning dependencies, adding integrity checks, documenting browser and driver setup, and advising users about scraping-r

This code collects local traceback and project source files and sends them to an external LLM API, then may overwrite local files with returned code. That is a high-risk pattern: it enables exfiltration of potentially sensitive code and automatic remote-controlled modifications to the filesystem (code injection / supply-chain risk). Even if intended for convenience, deployed in production or on developer machines containing secrets, it poses a strong security and privacy hazard. I assess this as likely malicious or at minimum dangerously insecure and unsuitable for use without significant safeguards (explicit consent, file allowlists, secret redaction, and manual review before writing files).

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This file creates a persistent reverse shell connection to example[.]com on port 43197, allowing remote command execution and potential data exfiltration. The connection is automatically reestablished every few seconds if interrupted, indicating clear malicious intent.

The preinstall hook runs a local bundled JavaScript file during npm install. By itself this is not proof of malware, but it is a high-risk operation because it executes code with the installer's privileges. You should inspect the contents of dist/index.esm.js (or block preinstall scripts) before installing, verify the package source and integrity, and avoid installing in sensitive environments until the file is reviewed.

Live on npm for 4 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code poses a serious security risk and should not be used.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 16 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Legitimate database operation module with a critical code injection vulnerability. The direct execution of user-provided map-reduce operators without validation poses significant security risk, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution on the MongoDB server.

Live on npm for 1 day and 37 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This source file implements a network pivot/listener component of the Sliver implant framework, enabling encrypted peer-to-peer pivoting and forwarding of protobuf-based C2 envelopes. Behavior is consistent with a remote control implant component and therefore presents high security risk in most benign deployment contexts (it is explicitly an implant/C2 artifact). The code itself does not show obfuscation or obvious credential harvesting beyond normal C2 functionality, but it forwards potentially arbitrary data upstream and downstream which can be used for command-and-control and data exfiltration. Use of this code in a project should be considered malicious unless the package is intentionally used in an offensive security context with appropriate authorization.

This script silently collects the host machine's hostname (via os.hostname()) and an optional project identifier (from process.argv[2], defaulting to "unknown"), packages them into a JSON string, URL-encodes the result, and issues an HTTPS GET request to https://z0[.]rs/callback?msg=<payload>. It explicitly disables TLS certificate validation (rejectUnauthorized:false) and suppresses errors, enabling transmission of system information without user notification or consent. The disabled TLS verification exposes the data to potential man-in-the-middle interception. While the data collected is limited to hostname and project ID, this constitutes unauthorized telemetry that operates without user awareness or consent.

Live on npm for 9 days, 12 hours and 40 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script is designed to send potentially sensitive information to a remote server, which poses a significant security risk and indicates malicious behavior.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

The code is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system information to an external domain without user consent, indicating malicious intent. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 2 hours and 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The module is a thin wrapper that exposes dangerous sinks (os.system and requests.get) and delegates to an opaque third-party module (danielutils). The file itself does not contain explicit malicious payloads, obfuscation, or hardcoded secrets, but it materially increases risk by providing direct access to shell execution and network requests, and by relying on an external, unreviewed dependency. Recommend auditing the danielutils package and any call sites that use these wrappers; avoid passing untrusted input to os_system and ensure requests.get usage does not leak sensitive data.