Secure your dependencies. Ship with confidence.

This module is explicitly designed for mass emailing (mail bombing). It accepts SMTP credentials and sends an HTML payload to many recipients using multiple threads, lacking safeguards (validation, rate limiting, retries, secure secrets handling). The presented file contains syntax and robustness issues but the intended behavior is abusive. Treat this as high-risk code: do not run it in any production or trusted environment. If found in a dependency tree, remove it, rotate any exposed credentials, and investigate how it was introduced.

The code permits runtime evaluation and loading of scripts discovered within its content, a capability that can be legitimate for dynamic features but poses strong security risks in supply chain contexts. Without sanitization, validation, or sandboxing, this pattern enables arbitrary code execution from untrusted input, increasing the risk of data leakage, unauthorized actions, and potential compromise of the host page.

The dominant security concern is the explicit use of eval on data-derived JSON within CarbonPHP.handlebars, which can enable arbitrary code execution if data is attacker-controlled. Additional concerns include unsanitized dynamic script/template loading and a busy-wait sleep that can degrade performance and potentially expose timing information. Overall risk is high due to the eval pattern and dynamic content loading without strong sanitization.

This code is not demonstrably malicious (no backdoor, reverse shell, or obfuscated exfiltration), but it contains significant security issues: a hardcoded Consul host and token, printing of the database password to stdout, and DEBUG logging. These represent a high risk of secret leakage and unauthorized access to Consul and the MySQL instance. Remove hardcoded tokens, avoid printing secrets, use secure secret management and logging practices, and add robust error checking.

Live on pypi for 11 hours and 45 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code demonstrates high-risk behavior typical of dropper/packer-like workflows: encrypted payloads embedded in stubs, base64-wrapped code executed at runtime, and optional packaging into executables. While there are syntax anomalies and incomplete branches that prevent immediate execution, the overall pattern is aligned with covert payload delivery or supply-chain risk. Thorough review of the complete, verified source is required before use; treat as dangerous and isolate until confirmed safe.

The code is highly suspicious, it appears to be harvesting sensitive user and system data and exfiltrating it to a potentially malicious remote server. It should be considered a serious security threat and possibly part of a supply chain attack.

Live on npm for 2 days, 8 hours and 40 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This setup.py contains an explicit, high-risk post-install action that executes privileged system-level commands to install external packages during installation. This constitutes a significant supply-chain and privilege-escalation risk. Do not run this setup on untrusted systems; the post-install command should be removed or replaced by declaring dependencies properly (install_requires or documentation) and never invoking sudo during package installation. Treat this package as unsafe until the post-install behavior is audited and removed.

The code presents a high security risk due to the use of 'exec' with untrusted input, allowing for arbitrary command execution. This can be exploited for malicious purposes, though the code itself is not inherently malicious.

The analyzed code shows high-confidence indicators of covert data capture (especially audio exfiltration via patched Web Audio APIs), dynamic native addon loading with temporary binary payloads, offscreen rendering with potential covert signaling, and aggressive network/webRequest manipulation. While some components could serve legitimate testing or forensic workflows, the combination constitutes a severe privacy and security risk in typical Electron app distributions. This should be treated as malware-like behavior or a backdoor-like capability, requiring removal or thorough, transparent auditing and clear user consent mechanisms before any production use.

This code is malicious or highly privacy-invasive: it scans wide areas of the host filesystem (including user folders and Windows drives), reads file contents to identify secrets (explicitly prioritizing .env and similar), and uploads matched files to a remote server. The use of obfuscation and dynamic evaluation of worker code increases risk and evasion. Treat the package as malicious and do not run it on trusted systems. Immediate remediation: remove the package, rotate any potentially exposed credentials, and investigate systems where it executed.

The script is malicious in nature, as it is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system information to an external server. The use of base64 encoding is a weak attempt to obfuscate the data being sent. The script poses a high security risk due to the potential for data breaches and further attacks.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 26 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The module contains an explicit arbitrary code execution primitive: it fetches script source text over the network and executes it with eval(code), then runs the resulting code’s lifecycle methods. It also allows external actions to set the base URL used for fetching executable scripts. This is a strong supply-chain/runtime-compromise risk requiring mitigation (remove eval, enforce strict origin and integrity checks, or run scripts in a hardened sandbox with capability controls).

The most significant and concrete security signal in this fragment is hardcoded secret/credential injection: a token-embedded Git repository URL is written into process.env (DD_GIT_REPOSITORY_URL) along with a pinned commit SHA at import time. This can enable authenticated automated retrieval of code or other SCM-driven actions by later components, and it increases the likelihood of credential exposure via logs/debugging. Additional uncertainty exists due to side-effect imports and immediate execution of require_enquirer(), but no direct exfiltration or shell execution is visible in this snippet alone.

This module is high risk. It unconditionally downloads binary JARs from externally controlled Google Drive URLs (with an embedded API key) and overwrites installed saspy package files at import-time without integrity checks or user consent. It also contains a helper that forwards user credentials to hardcoded remote SAS hosts and disables TLS verification in at least one call. While no explicit reverse shell or direct exfiltration is present in the Python fragment, the replacement of package JARs is a powerful supply-chain attack vector that can enable arbitrary code execution when those JARs are loaded. Do not import or run this module in trusted environments. Verify the provenance and contents of the remote JARs and remove/replace this code; treat the package as compromised until proven otherwise.

This fragment appears to be part of a legitimate DOS/pDOS post-processing tool for Quantum ESPRESSO, but it uses multiple high-risk patterns: executing external Python files (exec(open(...).read())), copying and injecting variable content into a script and then executing it, and using bare excepts that suppress errors. These behaviors make the module vulnerable to supply-chain or local-file-tampering attacks: if an attacker can modify files in main_dir or dir_files (or influence the variables used to build filenames), they can achieve arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the user running this script. I did not find explicit malicious payloads (no networking/exfiltration, no reverse shell code, no hardcoded secrets), so the code itself looks more insecure than intentionally malicious. Recommendation: avoid exec on arbitrary files; validate and/or cryptographically verify any scripts before executing; minimize use of globals and prefer importing modules safely; sanitize inputs and fail loudly rather than swallowing exceptions. Also review the rest of the project for places that set the variables used to build filenames. Note: the fragment contains multiple syntax errors and appears truncated which reduces certainty of the analysis.

Live on pypi for 16 hours and 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a high-risk runtime packer/dropper: it embeds an encrypted payload, decrypts it using a user-supplied passphrase, writes the result to `bin/do-setup-circleci-secrets`, and immediately executes it. Because there is no integrity/authenticity validation of the decrypted artifact and the executed code is not shown here, the module should be treated as potentially malicious until the decrypted `bin/do-setup-circleci-secrets` content is inspected and validated in a safe environment.

No clear malicious behavior in the provided fragment. The code is heavily obfuscated (likely via an automated packer) but the visible logic performs a Google Ads audience search using a supplied search term and provided credentials and sends the GAQL query to the Google Ads API. No evidence of credential harvesting, filesystem damage, reverse shell, or calls to suspicious external domains was found in this fragment. However, the obfuscation increases uncertainty and I recommend reviewing the required GoogleAdsClient module and deobfuscating or obtaining the original source to fully trust the package.

This script is making an external request to the URL 'http://eot7lh31glz15fb.m.pipedream.net'. The purpose of this request is not clear and could potentially be malicious. The user should carefully review the code to ensure that this behavior is intended and not harmful.

Live on npm for 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This module is an LLM-agent execution engine that exposes high-privilege tools to the model and executes them on the host (execSync shell commands, arbitrary file read/write, and curl-based web fetch/search). It additionally spawns externally configured MCP server commands with shell:true. Because untrusted LLM/user-controlled tool inputs flow directly into these sinks with minimal validation, the overall security risk is extremely high; it functionally resembles a remote-controlled “agentic” backdoor/exploitation console rather than a safe library component.

This module contains a clear sabotage pattern: a heartbeat that, after a configured delay, calls eval("this.someBadName();") which will throw an exception and likely destabilize or crash the host process. There is no evidence of data exfiltration or credential theft in this file, but the timed availability attack constitutes a high-risk supply-chain sabotage. Recommend removing or replacing the eval call, replacing it with safe behavior, and auditing the package/version for other intentionally harmful code.

This module is explicitly designed for mass emailing (mail bombing). It accepts SMTP credentials and sends an HTML payload to many recipients using multiple threads, lacking safeguards (validation, rate limiting, retries, secure secrets handling). The presented file contains syntax and robustness issues but the intended behavior is abusive. Treat this as high-risk code: do not run it in any production or trusted environment. If found in a dependency tree, remove it, rotate any exposed credentials, and investigate how it was introduced.

The code permits runtime evaluation and loading of scripts discovered within its content, a capability that can be legitimate for dynamic features but poses strong security risks in supply chain contexts. Without sanitization, validation, or sandboxing, this pattern enables arbitrary code execution from untrusted input, increasing the risk of data leakage, unauthorized actions, and potential compromise of the host page.

The dominant security concern is the explicit use of eval on data-derived JSON within CarbonPHP.handlebars, which can enable arbitrary code execution if data is attacker-controlled. Additional concerns include unsanitized dynamic script/template loading and a busy-wait sleep that can degrade performance and potentially expose timing information. Overall risk is high due to the eval pattern and dynamic content loading without strong sanitization.

This code is not demonstrably malicious (no backdoor, reverse shell, or obfuscated exfiltration), but it contains significant security issues: a hardcoded Consul host and token, printing of the database password to stdout, and DEBUG logging. These represent a high risk of secret leakage and unauthorized access to Consul and the MySQL instance. Remove hardcoded tokens, avoid printing secrets, use secure secret management and logging practices, and add robust error checking.

Live on pypi for 11 hours and 45 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code demonstrates high-risk behavior typical of dropper/packer-like workflows: encrypted payloads embedded in stubs, base64-wrapped code executed at runtime, and optional packaging into executables. While there are syntax anomalies and incomplete branches that prevent immediate execution, the overall pattern is aligned with covert payload delivery or supply-chain risk. Thorough review of the complete, verified source is required before use; treat as dangerous and isolate until confirmed safe.

The code is highly suspicious, it appears to be harvesting sensitive user and system data and exfiltrating it to a potentially malicious remote server. It should be considered a serious security threat and possibly part of a supply chain attack.

Live on npm for 2 days, 8 hours and 40 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This setup.py contains an explicit, high-risk post-install action that executes privileged system-level commands to install external packages during installation. This constitutes a significant supply-chain and privilege-escalation risk. Do not run this setup on untrusted systems; the post-install command should be removed or replaced by declaring dependencies properly (install_requires or documentation) and never invoking sudo during package installation. Treat this package as unsafe until the post-install behavior is audited and removed.

The code presents a high security risk due to the use of 'exec' with untrusted input, allowing for arbitrary command execution. This can be exploited for malicious purposes, though the code itself is not inherently malicious.

The analyzed code shows high-confidence indicators of covert data capture (especially audio exfiltration via patched Web Audio APIs), dynamic native addon loading with temporary binary payloads, offscreen rendering with potential covert signaling, and aggressive network/webRequest manipulation. While some components could serve legitimate testing or forensic workflows, the combination constitutes a severe privacy and security risk in typical Electron app distributions. This should be treated as malware-like behavior or a backdoor-like capability, requiring removal or thorough, transparent auditing and clear user consent mechanisms before any production use.

This code is malicious or highly privacy-invasive: it scans wide areas of the host filesystem (including user folders and Windows drives), reads file contents to identify secrets (explicitly prioritizing .env and similar), and uploads matched files to a remote server. The use of obfuscation and dynamic evaluation of worker code increases risk and evasion. Treat the package as malicious and do not run it on trusted systems. Immediate remediation: remove the package, rotate any potentially exposed credentials, and investigate systems where it executed.

The script is malicious in nature, as it is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system information to an external server. The use of base64 encoding is a weak attempt to obfuscate the data being sent. The script poses a high security risk due to the potential for data breaches and further attacks.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 26 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The module contains an explicit arbitrary code execution primitive: it fetches script source text over the network and executes it with eval(code), then runs the resulting code’s lifecycle methods. It also allows external actions to set the base URL used for fetching executable scripts. This is a strong supply-chain/runtime-compromise risk requiring mitigation (remove eval, enforce strict origin and integrity checks, or run scripts in a hardened sandbox with capability controls).

The most significant and concrete security signal in this fragment is hardcoded secret/credential injection: a token-embedded Git repository URL is written into process.env (DD_GIT_REPOSITORY_URL) along with a pinned commit SHA at import time. This can enable authenticated automated retrieval of code or other SCM-driven actions by later components, and it increases the likelihood of credential exposure via logs/debugging. Additional uncertainty exists due to side-effect imports and immediate execution of require_enquirer(), but no direct exfiltration or shell execution is visible in this snippet alone.

This module is high risk. It unconditionally downloads binary JARs from externally controlled Google Drive URLs (with an embedded API key) and overwrites installed saspy package files at import-time without integrity checks or user consent. It also contains a helper that forwards user credentials to hardcoded remote SAS hosts and disables TLS verification in at least one call. While no explicit reverse shell or direct exfiltration is present in the Python fragment, the replacement of package JARs is a powerful supply-chain attack vector that can enable arbitrary code execution when those JARs are loaded. Do not import or run this module in trusted environments. Verify the provenance and contents of the remote JARs and remove/replace this code; treat the package as compromised until proven otherwise.

This fragment appears to be part of a legitimate DOS/pDOS post-processing tool for Quantum ESPRESSO, but it uses multiple high-risk patterns: executing external Python files (exec(open(...).read())), copying and injecting variable content into a script and then executing it, and using bare excepts that suppress errors. These behaviors make the module vulnerable to supply-chain or local-file-tampering attacks: if an attacker can modify files in main_dir or dir_files (or influence the variables used to build filenames), they can achieve arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the user running this script. I did not find explicit malicious payloads (no networking/exfiltration, no reverse shell code, no hardcoded secrets), so the code itself looks more insecure than intentionally malicious. Recommendation: avoid exec on arbitrary files; validate and/or cryptographically verify any scripts before executing; minimize use of globals and prefer importing modules safely; sanitize inputs and fail loudly rather than swallowing exceptions. Also review the rest of the project for places that set the variables used to build filenames. Note: the fragment contains multiple syntax errors and appears truncated which reduces certainty of the analysis.

Live on pypi for 16 hours and 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a high-risk runtime packer/dropper: it embeds an encrypted payload, decrypts it using a user-supplied passphrase, writes the result to `bin/do-setup-circleci-secrets`, and immediately executes it. Because there is no integrity/authenticity validation of the decrypted artifact and the executed code is not shown here, the module should be treated as potentially malicious until the decrypted `bin/do-setup-circleci-secrets` content is inspected and validated in a safe environment.

No clear malicious behavior in the provided fragment. The code is heavily obfuscated (likely via an automated packer) but the visible logic performs a Google Ads audience search using a supplied search term and provided credentials and sends the GAQL query to the Google Ads API. No evidence of credential harvesting, filesystem damage, reverse shell, or calls to suspicious external domains was found in this fragment. However, the obfuscation increases uncertainty and I recommend reviewing the required GoogleAdsClient module and deobfuscating or obtaining the original source to fully trust the package.

This script is making an external request to the URL 'http://eot7lh31glz15fb.m.pipedream.net'. The purpose of this request is not clear and could potentially be malicious. The user should carefully review the code to ensure that this behavior is intended and not harmful.

Live on npm for 5 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This module is an LLM-agent execution engine that exposes high-privilege tools to the model and executes them on the host (execSync shell commands, arbitrary file read/write, and curl-based web fetch/search). It additionally spawns externally configured MCP server commands with shell:true. Because untrusted LLM/user-controlled tool inputs flow directly into these sinks with minimal validation, the overall security risk is extremely high; it functionally resembles a remote-controlled “agentic” backdoor/exploitation console rather than a safe library component.

This module contains a clear sabotage pattern: a heartbeat that, after a configured delay, calls eval("this.someBadName();") which will throw an exception and likely destabilize or crash the host process. There is no evidence of data exfiltration or credential theft in this file, but the timed availability attack constitutes a high-risk supply-chain sabotage. Recommend removing or replacing the eval call, replacing it with safe behavior, and auditing the package/version for other intentionally harmful code.