Secure your dependencies. Ship with confidence.

This file is the main agent for the Sliver implant (a remote access/C2 framework). It collects host metadata, establishes outbound C2 connections (beacon or session), accepts and executes remote tasks, and can open sessions/pivots/tunnels. That behavior is consistent with a malware/backdoor implant intended for remote control and data exfiltration. Treat this package as malicious in a defensive context and do not run it in production networks. Further review of the handlers, transports, and pivots modules is required to enumerate exact capabilities (command execution, file exfiltration, credential theft, etc.).

This module implements pivot management and framed protobuf I/O for the Sliver implant. It is part of a command-and-control implant (malicious by purpose) and will relay local pivot connections and metadata to a remote controller. The code has multiple robustness and safety issues (no bounds checks on message length, lack of nil checks on pivot lookups, inconsistent error handling, and some concurrency design problems) that increase the chance of crashes or resource exhaustion. There is no evidence of code obfuscation or in-file credential theft, but the component should be considered high-risk/malicious and avoided in benign projects.

The Python module itself is not directly implementing typical malware behaviors, but it creates a high-risk execution surface: it runs local shell scripts (some with sudo) with unvalidated inputs and passes secrets on the command line. The deploy_fdb_from_file_service function contains a command-injection vulnerability (shell=True with joined args) and a coding bug (returncod typo). Recommend: remove shell=True; use argument lists always, avoid passing secrets via argv (use stdin, environment files with proper filesystem permissions, or secured IPC), eliminate unnecessary sudo calls and require callers to provide appropriate privileges if needed, validate/escape inputs (especially file paths), fix the returncod typo, and audit all invoked shell scripts before use. Treat package as risky until mitigations and script audits are performed.

This module is a high-confidence malicious-style OS command execution handler. It dynamically constructs and executes platform-specific shell/WScript commands via child_process.exec, includes disruptive/destructive action templates (shutdown/restart/lock/kill/format/reg deletion-like patterns), provides clipboard read/write functionality, and supports host reconnaissance. Heavy runtime string obfuscation further increases the likelihood of covert/backdoor intent. While the full triggering and exfiltration paths are not shown, the capabilities present here warrant treating the dependency as dangerous.

`lotusbail` is a malicious npm package that masquerades as a WhatsApp Web API library by forking legitimate Baileys-based code and preserving working messaging functionality. In addition to normal API behavior, it inserts a wrapper around the WhatsApp WebSocket client so that all traffic passing through the library is duplicated for collection. Reported data theft includes WhatsApp authentication tokens and session keys, full message content (sent/received and historical), contact lists (including phone numbers), and transferred media/files. The package also attempts to establish persistent unauthorized access by hijacking the WhatsApp device-linking (“pairing”) workflow using a hardcoded pairing code, effectively linking an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account; removing the npm dependency does not automatically remove the linked device. To hinder detection, the exfiltration endpoint is hidden behind multiple obfuscation layers, collected data is encrypted (including a custom RSA implementation), and the code includes anti-debugging traps designed to disrupt analysis.

The code contains highly malicious behavior consistent with ransomware. It encrypts user files and communicates with an external command and control server. It should not be used under any circumstances.

Live on npm for 3 hours and 43 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a purpose-built application-layer denial-of-service tool implementing Slowloris, slow POST, and slow-read techniques. It actively opens and maintains many outbound TCP connections and sends slow/incomplete HTTP traffic to exhaust server resources. The code is not obfuscated and is straightforward to read. Because it is explicitly designed to perform network attacks, it poses a high security risk and should not be included in benign projects or run against systems without explicit authorization. Use in supply chains represents a severe risk of misuse and potential legal liability.

This module is a clear HTTP flooding/denial-of-service tool: it constructs and runs many threads to open HTTP connections to arbitrary, caller-specified URLs at a configurable high rate. It lacks any safety checks, validation, or consent mechanisms. The supplied snippet is also syntactically incomplete (truncated exception handler), showing poor code quality or an incomplete sample. Because the code enables abusive network activity and resource exhaustion, it represents a high security risk and should not be included or executed in trusted systems. Treat as malicious/abusive tooling unless explicit, auditable intent and safeguards are documented and enforced.

This preinstall script executes the package's index.js during installation and suppresses output. Without inspecting index.js, you cannot determine whether it is benign setup code or malicious. Because it runs code silently during install, treat this as a high-risk behavior and review the contents of index.js (and any files it loads or network endpoints it contacts) before installing in a sensitive environment.

Live on npm for 9 hours and 33 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is a DNS-based C2 client implementation (Sliver implant framework). It intentionally encodes and transmits encrypted payloads inside DNS queries/responses to remote resolvers, enabling command-and-control and data exfiltration. In typical threat models this constitutes malicious/suspicious software and should not be used in production environments. It exhibits some implementation issues (non-crypto random resolver selection, potential race on metrics map, debug logging) but the primary risk is its intended covert C2 functionality.

This dependency is highly suspicious from a privacy/security standpoint. It automates joining Teams/Meet and performs invasive microphone/audio capture by hooking AudioContext stream creation, recording audio with MediaRecorder, transferring captured audio via CDP into Node, and persisting it to recording.webm alongside speaker logs. It also injects and executes meeting-page JS via CDP. While it may be intended for legitimate meeting transcription/synthesis, the behavior matches spyware/audio-surveillance patterns and is a serious supply-chain risk if used without explicit user consent and transparent disclosure.

This module is highly security-sensitive: it directly edits the system hosts file to redirect/block a hardcoded set of third-party service domains to 127.0.0.1 and flushes DNS caches to enforce the change. It also implements privileged execution flows (non-Windows sudo with caller-supplied password and Windows elevated PowerShell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass and hidden execution). Even without clear network exfiltration in the provided fragment, the combination of system-level traffic manipulation and elevated execution strongly matches sabotage/traffic-interception behavior and should be treated as dangerous unless its triggering and inputs are strictly controlled.

The code is likely intended for malicious purposes, as it seems to exfiltrate data to a server with hardcoded credentials. The existence of potentially sensitive file extensions such as '.env' among others indicates the possibility of targeted data theft.

Live on npm for 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

The code presents a strong supply-chain and remote-execution risk by automatically downloading and executing remote Python payloads without integrity checks or sandboxing. It also creates and runs external services (Jupyter, Visdom, RStudio) based on user inputs, which can amplify impact if the remote payload is malicious. Mitigations include removing remote code execution paths, adding cryptographic verification (signatures or hash checks), isolating execution (sandboxes or containerization), validating inputs, and avoiding untrusted downloads or executions.

The use of obfuscation techniques (base64, zlib, exec) and the lack of clear code execution make this code suspicious. It could potentially execute harmful actions, and the intent is not clear without further de-obfuscation.

Best report selection: Report 2 is most aligned with the code’s primary, verifiable issue (exec on Component.custom_methods) and secondary filesystem risks. Improved assessment: This module contains an explicit arbitrary code execution primitive (exec on database content) and dynamically binds resulting callables onto a live Django model instance. That is backdoor/persistence-equivalent behavior if Component.custom_methods can be influenced. File deletion via os.remove(path) on stored FileField paths is a secondary safety risk. No direct network exfiltration is visible here, but the exec primitive makes it feasible. Treat the package/module as high-risk unless strong guarantees exist that custom_methods is never attacker-controlled.

The script disables TLS certificate validation, making it vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, it downloads data from an external source and saves it in the user's home directory, which can introduce potential risks.

Live on npm for 3 days, 11 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains multiple high-risk, potentially malicious behaviors: self-modifying source code, writing hardcoded PyPI credentials to ~/.pypirc, automating twine uploads, and attempting to append/inject content into site-packages during installation. These actions enable unauthorized package publishing, credential misuse, and persistent backdoors. I classify this as likely malicious and not safe to use. Recommend not installing or running this package, audit systems where it ran, and treat the hardcoded credentials as compromised.

The code unconditionally kills all running Streamlit processes and then attempts to start a Streamlit app from a user-specific path. This behavior can disrupt legitimate usage and execute potentially untrusted user code without validation. While it may be intended for self-restart or deployment, the lack of safety nets (validation, error handling, logging, and user prompts) represents a significant reliability and security risk that warrants safer alternatives (graceful shutdown, confirm prompts, path validation, and explicit permissions).

The code is clearly performing a malicious action by sending sensitive system data over the network without consent. This behavior is consistent with data exfiltration, which is a form of malware.

Live on npm for 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is the main agent for the Sliver implant (a remote access/C2 framework). It collects host metadata, establishes outbound C2 connections (beacon or session), accepts and executes remote tasks, and can open sessions/pivots/tunnels. That behavior is consistent with a malware/backdoor implant intended for remote control and data exfiltration. Treat this package as malicious in a defensive context and do not run it in production networks. Further review of the handlers, transports, and pivots modules is required to enumerate exact capabilities (command execution, file exfiltration, credential theft, etc.).

This module implements pivot management and framed protobuf I/O for the Sliver implant. It is part of a command-and-control implant (malicious by purpose) and will relay local pivot connections and metadata to a remote controller. The code has multiple robustness and safety issues (no bounds checks on message length, lack of nil checks on pivot lookups, inconsistent error handling, and some concurrency design problems) that increase the chance of crashes or resource exhaustion. There is no evidence of code obfuscation or in-file credential theft, but the component should be considered high-risk/malicious and avoided in benign projects.

The Python module itself is not directly implementing typical malware behaviors, but it creates a high-risk execution surface: it runs local shell scripts (some with sudo) with unvalidated inputs and passes secrets on the command line. The deploy_fdb_from_file_service function contains a command-injection vulnerability (shell=True with joined args) and a coding bug (returncod typo). Recommend: remove shell=True; use argument lists always, avoid passing secrets via argv (use stdin, environment files with proper filesystem permissions, or secured IPC), eliminate unnecessary sudo calls and require callers to provide appropriate privileges if needed, validate/escape inputs (especially file paths), fix the returncod typo, and audit all invoked shell scripts before use. Treat package as risky until mitigations and script audits are performed.

This module is a high-confidence malicious-style OS command execution handler. It dynamically constructs and executes platform-specific shell/WScript commands via child_process.exec, includes disruptive/destructive action templates (shutdown/restart/lock/kill/format/reg deletion-like patterns), provides clipboard read/write functionality, and supports host reconnaissance. Heavy runtime string obfuscation further increases the likelihood of covert/backdoor intent. While the full triggering and exfiltration paths are not shown, the capabilities present here warrant treating the dependency as dangerous.

`lotusbail` is a malicious npm package that masquerades as a WhatsApp Web API library by forking legitimate Baileys-based code and preserving working messaging functionality. In addition to normal API behavior, it inserts a wrapper around the WhatsApp WebSocket client so that all traffic passing through the library is duplicated for collection. Reported data theft includes WhatsApp authentication tokens and session keys, full message content (sent/received and historical), contact lists (including phone numbers), and transferred media/files. The package also attempts to establish persistent unauthorized access by hijacking the WhatsApp device-linking (“pairing”) workflow using a hardcoded pairing code, effectively linking an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account; removing the npm dependency does not automatically remove the linked device. To hinder detection, the exfiltration endpoint is hidden behind multiple obfuscation layers, collected data is encrypted (including a custom RSA implementation), and the code includes anti-debugging traps designed to disrupt analysis.

The code contains highly malicious behavior consistent with ransomware. It encrypts user files and communicates with an external command and control server. It should not be used under any circumstances.

Live on npm for 3 hours and 43 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a purpose-built application-layer denial-of-service tool implementing Slowloris, slow POST, and slow-read techniques. It actively opens and maintains many outbound TCP connections and sends slow/incomplete HTTP traffic to exhaust server resources. The code is not obfuscated and is straightforward to read. Because it is explicitly designed to perform network attacks, it poses a high security risk and should not be included in benign projects or run against systems without explicit authorization. Use in supply chains represents a severe risk of misuse and potential legal liability.

This module is a clear HTTP flooding/denial-of-service tool: it constructs and runs many threads to open HTTP connections to arbitrary, caller-specified URLs at a configurable high rate. It lacks any safety checks, validation, or consent mechanisms. The supplied snippet is also syntactically incomplete (truncated exception handler), showing poor code quality or an incomplete sample. Because the code enables abusive network activity and resource exhaustion, it represents a high security risk and should not be included or executed in trusted systems. Treat as malicious/abusive tooling unless explicit, auditable intent and safeguards are documented and enforced.

This preinstall script executes the package's index.js during installation and suppresses output. Without inspecting index.js, you cannot determine whether it is benign setup code or malicious. Because it runs code silently during install, treat this as a high-risk behavior and review the contents of index.js (and any files it loads or network endpoints it contacts) before installing in a sensitive environment.

Live on npm for 9 hours and 33 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is a DNS-based C2 client implementation (Sliver implant framework). It intentionally encodes and transmits encrypted payloads inside DNS queries/responses to remote resolvers, enabling command-and-control and data exfiltration. In typical threat models this constitutes malicious/suspicious software and should not be used in production environments. It exhibits some implementation issues (non-crypto random resolver selection, potential race on metrics map, debug logging) but the primary risk is its intended covert C2 functionality.

This dependency is highly suspicious from a privacy/security standpoint. It automates joining Teams/Meet and performs invasive microphone/audio capture by hooking AudioContext stream creation, recording audio with MediaRecorder, transferring captured audio via CDP into Node, and persisting it to recording.webm alongside speaker logs. It also injects and executes meeting-page JS via CDP. While it may be intended for legitimate meeting transcription/synthesis, the behavior matches spyware/audio-surveillance patterns and is a serious supply-chain risk if used without explicit user consent and transparent disclosure.

This module is highly security-sensitive: it directly edits the system hosts file to redirect/block a hardcoded set of third-party service domains to 127.0.0.1 and flushes DNS caches to enforce the change. It also implements privileged execution flows (non-Windows sudo with caller-supplied password and Windows elevated PowerShell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass and hidden execution). Even without clear network exfiltration in the provided fragment, the combination of system-level traffic manipulation and elevated execution strongly matches sabotage/traffic-interception behavior and should be treated as dangerous unless its triggering and inputs are strictly controlled.

The code is likely intended for malicious purposes, as it seems to exfiltrate data to a server with hardcoded credentials. The existence of potentially sensitive file extensions such as '.env' among others indicates the possibility of targeted data theft.

Live on npm for 14 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

The code presents a strong supply-chain and remote-execution risk by automatically downloading and executing remote Python payloads without integrity checks or sandboxing. It also creates and runs external services (Jupyter, Visdom, RStudio) based on user inputs, which can amplify impact if the remote payload is malicious. Mitigations include removing remote code execution paths, adding cryptographic verification (signatures or hash checks), isolating execution (sandboxes or containerization), validating inputs, and avoiding untrusted downloads or executions.

The use of obfuscation techniques (base64, zlib, exec) and the lack of clear code execution make this code suspicious. It could potentially execute harmful actions, and the intent is not clear without further de-obfuscation.

Best report selection: Report 2 is most aligned with the code’s primary, verifiable issue (exec on Component.custom_methods) and secondary filesystem risks. Improved assessment: This module contains an explicit arbitrary code execution primitive (exec on database content) and dynamically binds resulting callables onto a live Django model instance. That is backdoor/persistence-equivalent behavior if Component.custom_methods can be influenced. File deletion via os.remove(path) on stored FileField paths is a secondary safety risk. No direct network exfiltration is visible here, but the exec primitive makes it feasible. Treat the package/module as high-risk unless strong guarantees exist that custom_methods is never attacker-controlled.

The script disables TLS certificate validation, making it vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, it downloads data from an external source and saves it in the user's home directory, which can introduce potential risks.

Live on npm for 3 days, 11 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains multiple high-risk, potentially malicious behaviors: self-modifying source code, writing hardcoded PyPI credentials to ~/.pypirc, automating twine uploads, and attempting to append/inject content into site-packages during installation. These actions enable unauthorized package publishing, credential misuse, and persistent backdoors. I classify this as likely malicious and not safe to use. Recommend not installing or running this package, audit systems where it ran, and treat the hardcoded credentials as compromised.

The code unconditionally kills all running Streamlit processes and then attempts to start a Streamlit app from a user-specific path. This behavior can disrupt legitimate usage and execute potentially untrusted user code without validation. While it may be intended for self-restart or deployment, the lack of safety nets (validation, error handling, logging, and user prompts) represents a significant reliability and security risk that warrants safer alternatives (graceful shutdown, confirm prompts, path validation, and explicit permissions).

The code is clearly performing a malicious action by sending sensitive system data over the network without consent. This behavior is consistent with data exfiltration, which is a form of malware.

Live on npm for 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.