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The script exhibits explicit data exfiltration behavior: environment-variable scavenging across runner processes, runtime decoding and execution of embedded Python payloads to harvest memory-secret-like data, and secure transmission of collected data to external endpoints, with optional GitHub-based publishing. These actions indicate malicious intent or backdoor-like capabilities within a supply-chain context. While the script also invokes a legitimate scanning stage (Trivy), the exfiltration logic constitutes a critical security risk and warrants removal or thorough audit prior to any distribution.

This module exhibits high-risk patterns for supply-chain or runtime compromise: it connects to a hardcoded endpoint on instantiation, transmits caller data, and crucially may unpickle arbitrary bytes received from that endpoint. Unpickling untrusted data is a direct remote code execution vector. Combine that with lack of authentication, no TLS, and a fallback that silently switches to pickle, and the code should be considered dangerous for use in production. Recommend not using this module until pickling is removed for network interactions, robust validation/authentication is added, TLS is used, and the hardcoded endpoint behavior is eliminated or made opt-in and configurable. Review surrounding modules (utils, omnitools) for further issues before trusting this package.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The file contains code that secretly gathers detailed system information, such as hostname, OS type, platform, release, architecture, local IP addresses, public IP address (fetched via an external API), username, and current working directory. It then transmits this data to external endpoints via HTTP GET and POST requests, and uses a WebSocket connection as a fallback. The endpoints are hardcoded, for example, to URLs like http://example.com/jpd3.php, http://example.com/jpd4.php, and wss://example.com/socket, which are not transparent or verified services. This behavior is indicative of malware designed for unauthorized data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 4 hours and 50 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code implements remote dynamic class loading and execution via network fetch and reflection. While such a mechanism can be legitimate for plugin ecosystems, it introduces a clear remote-code-execution risk in supply-chain contexts. It should be treated as high-risk for unauthenticated payload loading and require strong controls: TLS, payload signing/verification, strict allowlists, sandboxing, and minimum privileges. If kept, ensure robust auditing and runtime protections.

The fragment implements a hidden command interception/instrumentation hook that leverages dynamic evaluation and external otel.sh sourcing. While instrumentation can be legitimate for observability, the combination of dynamic eval, environment-driven control, and aliasing BusyBox indicates a strong potential for covert data collection, command manipulation, or backdoor-like behavior. Treat as a supply-chain risk unless there is strong assurance of trusted, auditable tooling and strict access controls in the deployment environment.

The code poses significant security risks due to the dynamic execution of external scripts without validation, which could lead to the execution of malicious code. The reliance on external URLs for critical setup processes is a major vulnerability.

The code collects and sends system information to an external domain without user consent, which is a serious security risk and aligns with malicious behavior.

The code presents significant privacy risks and potential for misuse in generating fake identities, which is indicative of malicious intent. The scraping of sensitive information from a third-party website without clear user consent is highly suspicious.

Live on pypi for 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script demonstrates several malicious behaviors, including data theft (WiFi passwords), unauthorized system access (file access and command execution), and potential privacy violations (screen capture). The use of a hardcoded bot token and user ID further exacerbates security risks. This script poses a significant security threat and should be treated as malware.

Live on pypi for 39 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

[Skill Scanner] Instruction to copy/paste content into terminal detected This skill's actions are coherent with its stated purpose: uploading a tutorial notebook into a Snowflake account and creating a Snowsight link. It does require potentially high privileges (falls back to ACCOUNTADMIN and creates DB/WH resources) and instructs overwriting existing staged files without interactive confirmations — both are operational risks rather than indicators of malware. I found no evidence of credential harvesting, obfuscated code, or exfiltration to third-party domains. Recommend: (1) inspect the notebook file contents before upload to ensure it contains no secrets, (2) avoid running ACCOUNTADMIN fallback in production accounts, and (3) add explicit confirmations for destructive or high-privilege steps. LLM verification: This Skill is purpose-aligned: its documented capabilities line up with deploying a Jupyter notebook to Snowflake. There is no direct evidence of malware or exfiltration to third-party hosts. However there are notable security concerns: the fallback path requests ACCOUNTADMIN and creates databases/warehouses (privilege escalation beyond minimal needs), and the guidance to proceed without interactive confirmation increases risk of unattended or automated misuse. The operator's snow CLI credential

The assembly contains a highly obfuscated embedded runtime loader that decrypts an embedded or on-disk payload, verifies it cryptographically, allocates native memory and writes the decrypted payload into executable memory and/or remote process memory, and then prepares and invokes that code. These behaviors are consistent with a reflective loader/in-memory code injection mechanism. Regardless of whether the immediate intended use is legitimate (protected native payload or licensing enforcement), the techniques used are dangerous for a public dependency: they enable covert arbitrary native code execution and process injection. Treat this package as untrusted for sensitive environments. Recommend removing it from automated supply chains, performing a full provenance and build-source verification with the vendor, and replacing with a library that does not perform runtime native code injection.

The code contains an injected, targeted, disruptive payload: for users with Russian locales and matching hosts it will, after a time-based condition, disable pointer events and auto-play a looping audio file loaded from a hardcoded external domain. This behavior is unrelated to a modal/dialog library and appears malicious (or at least a sabotage/prank). Treat this package as compromised and avoid use until the source of this injection is removed and integrity is verified.

This script implements direct, unauthorized data exfiltration: it recursively searches the entire filesystem for files with the '.session' extension and uploads each found file to an external Telegram chat using a hardcoded bot token and chat id. The behavior is malicious (credential/session harvesting) and poses a high security risk. Treat as malware: remove the script, revoke the token, and investigate system compromise and data leakage.

Live on pypi for 5 hours and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly suspicious and exhibits several characteristics of malware. It is obfuscated, collects sensitive system information, and sends this information to a remote server using a covert method. The risk, malware, and obfuscation scores should all be high due to the serious nature of these activities.

Live on npm for 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module implements a command-and-control agent: it establishes a Tor connection to a hardcoded .onion C2, downloads a payload, writes it to a temporary file, sets it executable, and runs it — all without validation — and provides a POST endpoint for C2 communication. These are canonical backdoor behaviors (remote code execution, persistence, and concealed C2). Treat the code as malicious: do not execute, block the domain, and investigate any systems where this package or its parent repository was installed or run.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This assembly contains convincing indicators of a runtime loader/backdoor rather than a normal Umbraco helper. Key red flags: heavy obfuscation, anti-tamper and anti-analysis checks, reading and decrypting embedded blobs, low-level unmanaged memory allocation and writes, creating and invoking delegates from function pointers, and runtime reconstitution of functionality via encrypted metadata. Treat this package as high risk. Remove from production, block usage, and perform a deeper dynamic analysis of embedded resources and decrypted payloads in a safe sandbox to determine exact malicious behavior and scope.

This code implements common download and unzip utilities but contains a significant security weakness: unzip_file uses ZipFile.extract on raw archive member names without sanitization, enabling zip-slip path traversal and possible arbitrary file overwrite when processing untrusted archives. Additional concerns: ZipFile not used in a context manager (resource leak risk), requests.get called without timeouts (hang/DoS risk), and minimal validation of filenames derived from URLs. I assess this as non-malicious utility code with moderate security risk if used on untrusted inputs. Recommended fixes: validate and sanitize zip member names (reject absolute paths and path traversal, use safe-join to dst_dir), use with ZipFile(...) as fz:, add request timeouts and optional SSL/verify options, and validate derived filenames and work_directory paths.

Live on pypi for 3 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

High-risk, likely malicious script. It collects click identifiers (sub_id) for specified IPs and programmatically sends conversion postbacks (status='sale', payout=125) to a hardcoded external domain, which strongly indicates click-to-sale forgery and data exfiltration. The script also performs bulk modifications to campaigns (rename, move groups, disable auto cost, fix costs) that could be abused to manipulate accounting. Do not run this code in production. If you maintain this repository, remove or gate the postback logic, audit all Keitaro API credentials and recent changes, and investigate any communications with the external domain. Consider this code malicious and treat any systems where it ran as potentially compromised.

The code collects and sends potentially sensitive system data to a remote server without user consent, which is indicative of malicious behavior. This poses a significant security risk due to unauthorized data transmission.

Live on npm for 1 day, 13 hours and 48 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains otherwise-benign time parsing utilities but also includes a strongly obfuscated import-time payload in the __setup function that reconstructs and executes code via dynamic imports, getattr, decoding, and exec. That pattern is a high-risk supply-chain indicator (possible backdoor/downloader). Treat this package as compromised until the obfuscated block is fully deobfuscated and reviewed. Do not import or run this package in production; analyze the obfuscated payload in a safe sandbox or remove the autorun/obfuscated code before use.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

This code intentionally sends local files, request headers, cookies (including authentication tokens), server secret-key (if present), and fingerprint/device data to an external service api.qumra.cloud, and then uses the remote response to set cookies and inject content into responses. That pattern constitutes data exfiltration and remote-control of rendered content and cookies. If the remote endpoint is not fully trusted and audited, this is a high-risk supply-chain/third-party data-leak/backdoor vector. Recommend: do not include or enable this middleware unless the external service is explicitly trusted, remove sending of sensitive cookies/secret keys, sandbox or strictly sanitize remote-provided content, and avoid automatically setting cookies returned from external services.

The script exhibits explicit data exfiltration behavior: environment-variable scavenging across runner processes, runtime decoding and execution of embedded Python payloads to harvest memory-secret-like data, and secure transmission of collected data to external endpoints, with optional GitHub-based publishing. These actions indicate malicious intent or backdoor-like capabilities within a supply-chain context. While the script also invokes a legitimate scanning stage (Trivy), the exfiltration logic constitutes a critical security risk and warrants removal or thorough audit prior to any distribution.

This module exhibits high-risk patterns for supply-chain or runtime compromise: it connects to a hardcoded endpoint on instantiation, transmits caller data, and crucially may unpickle arbitrary bytes received from that endpoint. Unpickling untrusted data is a direct remote code execution vector. Combine that with lack of authentication, no TLS, and a fallback that silently switches to pickle, and the code should be considered dangerous for use in production. Recommend not using this module until pickling is removed for network interactions, robust validation/authentication is added, TLS is used, and the hardcoded endpoint behavior is eliminated or made opt-in and configurable. Review surrounding modules (utils, omnitools) for further issues before trusting this package.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The file contains code that secretly gathers detailed system information, such as hostname, OS type, platform, release, architecture, local IP addresses, public IP address (fetched via an external API), username, and current working directory. It then transmits this data to external endpoints via HTTP GET and POST requests, and uses a WebSocket connection as a fallback. The endpoints are hardcoded, for example, to URLs like http://example.com/jpd3.php, http://example.com/jpd4.php, and wss://example.com/socket, which are not transparent or verified services. This behavior is indicative of malware designed for unauthorized data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 4 hours and 50 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code implements remote dynamic class loading and execution via network fetch and reflection. While such a mechanism can be legitimate for plugin ecosystems, it introduces a clear remote-code-execution risk in supply-chain contexts. It should be treated as high-risk for unauthenticated payload loading and require strong controls: TLS, payload signing/verification, strict allowlists, sandboxing, and minimum privileges. If kept, ensure robust auditing and runtime protections.

The fragment implements a hidden command interception/instrumentation hook that leverages dynamic evaluation and external otel.sh sourcing. While instrumentation can be legitimate for observability, the combination of dynamic eval, environment-driven control, and aliasing BusyBox indicates a strong potential for covert data collection, command manipulation, or backdoor-like behavior. Treat as a supply-chain risk unless there is strong assurance of trusted, auditable tooling and strict access controls in the deployment environment.

The code poses significant security risks due to the dynamic execution of external scripts without validation, which could lead to the execution of malicious code. The reliance on external URLs for critical setup processes is a major vulnerability.

The code collects and sends system information to an external domain without user consent, which is a serious security risk and aligns with malicious behavior.

The code presents significant privacy risks and potential for misuse in generating fake identities, which is indicative of malicious intent. The scraping of sensitive information from a third-party website without clear user consent is highly suspicious.

Live on pypi for 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script demonstrates several malicious behaviors, including data theft (WiFi passwords), unauthorized system access (file access and command execution), and potential privacy violations (screen capture). The use of a hardcoded bot token and user ID further exacerbates security risks. This script poses a significant security threat and should be treated as malware.

Live on pypi for 39 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

[Skill Scanner] Instruction to copy/paste content into terminal detected This skill's actions are coherent with its stated purpose: uploading a tutorial notebook into a Snowflake account and creating a Snowsight link. It does require potentially high privileges (falls back to ACCOUNTADMIN and creates DB/WH resources) and instructs overwriting existing staged files without interactive confirmations — both are operational risks rather than indicators of malware. I found no evidence of credential harvesting, obfuscated code, or exfiltration to third-party domains. Recommend: (1) inspect the notebook file contents before upload to ensure it contains no secrets, (2) avoid running ACCOUNTADMIN fallback in production accounts, and (3) add explicit confirmations for destructive or high-privilege steps. LLM verification: This Skill is purpose-aligned: its documented capabilities line up with deploying a Jupyter notebook to Snowflake. There is no direct evidence of malware or exfiltration to third-party hosts. However there are notable security concerns: the fallback path requests ACCOUNTADMIN and creates databases/warehouses (privilege escalation beyond minimal needs), and the guidance to proceed without interactive confirmation increases risk of unattended or automated misuse. The operator's snow CLI credential

The assembly contains a highly obfuscated embedded runtime loader that decrypts an embedded or on-disk payload, verifies it cryptographically, allocates native memory and writes the decrypted payload into executable memory and/or remote process memory, and then prepares and invokes that code. These behaviors are consistent with a reflective loader/in-memory code injection mechanism. Regardless of whether the immediate intended use is legitimate (protected native payload or licensing enforcement), the techniques used are dangerous for a public dependency: they enable covert arbitrary native code execution and process injection. Treat this package as untrusted for sensitive environments. Recommend removing it from automated supply chains, performing a full provenance and build-source verification with the vendor, and replacing with a library that does not perform runtime native code injection.

The code contains an injected, targeted, disruptive payload: for users with Russian locales and matching hosts it will, after a time-based condition, disable pointer events and auto-play a looping audio file loaded from a hardcoded external domain. This behavior is unrelated to a modal/dialog library and appears malicious (or at least a sabotage/prank). Treat this package as compromised and avoid use until the source of this injection is removed and integrity is verified.

This script implements direct, unauthorized data exfiltration: it recursively searches the entire filesystem for files with the '.session' extension and uploads each found file to an external Telegram chat using a hardcoded bot token and chat id. The behavior is malicious (credential/session harvesting) and poses a high security risk. Treat as malware: remove the script, revoke the token, and investigate system compromise and data leakage.

Live on pypi for 5 hours and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is highly suspicious and exhibits several characteristics of malware. It is obfuscated, collects sensitive system information, and sends this information to a remote server using a covert method. The risk, malware, and obfuscation scores should all be high due to the serious nature of these activities.

Live on npm for 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module implements a command-and-control agent: it establishes a Tor connection to a hardcoded .onion C2, downloads a payload, writes it to a temporary file, sets it executable, and runs it — all without validation — and provides a POST endpoint for C2 communication. These are canonical backdoor behaviors (remote code execution, persistence, and concealed C2). Treat the code as malicious: do not execute, block the domain, and investigate any systems where this package or its parent repository was installed or run.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This assembly contains convincing indicators of a runtime loader/backdoor rather than a normal Umbraco helper. Key red flags: heavy obfuscation, anti-tamper and anti-analysis checks, reading and decrypting embedded blobs, low-level unmanaged memory allocation and writes, creating and invoking delegates from function pointers, and runtime reconstitution of functionality via encrypted metadata. Treat this package as high risk. Remove from production, block usage, and perform a deeper dynamic analysis of embedded resources and decrypted payloads in a safe sandbox to determine exact malicious behavior and scope.

This code implements common download and unzip utilities but contains a significant security weakness: unzip_file uses ZipFile.extract on raw archive member names without sanitization, enabling zip-slip path traversal and possible arbitrary file overwrite when processing untrusted archives. Additional concerns: ZipFile not used in a context manager (resource leak risk), requests.get called without timeouts (hang/DoS risk), and minimal validation of filenames derived from URLs. I assess this as non-malicious utility code with moderate security risk if used on untrusted inputs. Recommended fixes: validate and sanitize zip member names (reject absolute paths and path traversal, use safe-join to dst_dir), use with ZipFile(...) as fz:, add request timeouts and optional SSL/verify options, and validate derived filenames and work_directory paths.

Live on pypi for 3 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

High-risk, likely malicious script. It collects click identifiers (sub_id) for specified IPs and programmatically sends conversion postbacks (status='sale', payout=125) to a hardcoded external domain, which strongly indicates click-to-sale forgery and data exfiltration. The script also performs bulk modifications to campaigns (rename, move groups, disable auto cost, fix costs) that could be abused to manipulate accounting. Do not run this code in production. If you maintain this repository, remove or gate the postback logic, audit all Keitaro API credentials and recent changes, and investigate any communications with the external domain. Consider this code malicious and treat any systems where it ran as potentially compromised.

The code collects and sends potentially sensitive system data to a remote server without user consent, which is indicative of malicious behavior. This poses a significant security risk due to unauthorized data transmission.

Live on npm for 1 day, 13 hours and 48 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains otherwise-benign time parsing utilities but also includes a strongly obfuscated import-time payload in the __setup function that reconstructs and executes code via dynamic imports, getattr, decoding, and exec. That pattern is a high-risk supply-chain indicator (possible backdoor/downloader). Treat this package as compromised until the obfuscated block is fully deobfuscated and reviewed. Do not import or run this package in production; analyze the obfuscated payload in a safe sandbox or remove the autorun/obfuscated code before use.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

This code intentionally sends local files, request headers, cookies (including authentication tokens), server secret-key (if present), and fingerprint/device data to an external service api.qumra.cloud, and then uses the remote response to set cookies and inject content into responses. That pattern constitutes data exfiltration and remote-control of rendered content and cookies. If the remote endpoint is not fully trusted and audited, this is a high-risk supply-chain/third-party data-leak/backdoor vector. Recommend: do not include or enable this middleware unless the external service is explicitly trusted, remove sending of sensitive cookies/secret keys, sandbox or strictly sanitize remote-provided content, and avoid automatically setting cookies returned from external services.