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The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

The code implements an automated npm package publishing system that generates random package names and versions every 5 seconds, creating potential registry abuse. It hardcodes a placeholder authentication token directly in the source code (process.env.NODE_AUTH_TOKEN = 'your-npm-token'), which poses credential exposure risks if replaced with real tokens. The script continuously overwrites package.json with randomized metadata and executes 'npm publish' via execSync without rate limiting or validation. This behavior can lead to npm registry pollution, violation of npm policies, potential account suspension, and security risks from exposed authentication credentials. While not containing direct malicious payloads or data theft mechanisms, the automated spam-like publishing pattern represents abusive behavior that could disrupt the package ecosystem.

Live on npm for 10 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is high risk for supply-chain use. Its loader pattern (base64 + zlib obfuscation and immediate exec) conceals runtime behavior and enables arbitrary code execution at import time. Treat the package as untrusted until the embedded payload is decoded and audited in a secure, isolated environment. Recommended actions: decode and inspect payload offline, run it in an instrumented sandbox, and block use in production until verified.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by collecting and sending sensitive system data to an unknown external server without user consent.

High risk. The package downloads and installs an executable during npm install and does so while disabling TLS verification (--insecure). This is a supply-chain risk: a malicious or tampered binary could be placed on the system and executed, enabling data exfiltration, remote code execution, reverse shells, or other system compromise. At minimum review the binary before execution, remove or modify the postinstall, or require integrity verification (checksums or signatures) and remove the --insecure flag.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The code is designed to collect and transmit system information to external endpoints without user consent, which is indicative of malicious behavior. The hardcoded endpoints and the nature of the data being sent pose a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 21 hours and 44 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This migration will create a superuser account with predictable, hardcoded credentials ('admin@localhost' / 'admin') whenever the migration is applied. That is a severe security risk (effectively a backdoor) for any environment that runs the migration. No network exfiltration or other malicious payloads were found, but the creation of an easily guessed administrative account warrants urgent remediation: remove or change the RunPython hook, and treat this as a high-risk supply-chain/backdoor indicator.

The code poses a significant security risk and should be reviewed. It is recommended to remove unnecessary imports, verify the contents of the data folder and the WordPress websites before proceeding, and avoid using hardcoded credentials for WordPress login.

Live on npm for 53 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment demonstrates a backdoor-like mechanism: after a password check, it executes an embedded payload via an external interpreter. The use of templated placeholders and a per-build payload means distributed artifacts could silently execute attacker-supplied code. This is a significant supply-chain and runtime risk and warrants aggressive hardening, removal of dynamic code execution paths, or ensuring payloads are strictly controlled and auditable.

This script appears to be checking the operating system and running a PowerShell script on Windows. While this behavior may be intended for legitimate purposes, it is important to review the contents of the PowerShell script to ensure it does not contain any malicious code.

Live on npm for 17 days, 14 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file embeds and dynamically executes compressed/encoded Python payloads via base64 + LZMA and exec(), and uses obfuscated identifiers for subsequent calls. This is a highly suspicious pattern consistent with a loader/dropper or backdoor. Treat this module as high risk: do not run it in production or on sensitive hosts without first decompressing and auditing the payloads in a safe, isolated environment.

This package contains a critical arbitrary code execution vulnerability through unsafe use of exec() on user-controlled input. Any application using this library with untrusted model definitions is at extreme risk of complete system compromise.

The script collects sensitive user information from the Discord API, including usernames, emails, and IDs, and saves it to a file without user consent. It automates interactions with Discord, including sending unsolicited messages to channels (spamming), and uses a captcha solving service to bypass security measures. The script contains hardcoded API keys and tokens, posing significant security risks if shared or leaked. Additionally, it includes obfuscated JavaScript code to manipulate local storage tokens, suggesting attempts to hijack or misuse user accounts.

This module constructs an HTTP Basic Authorization header from provided credentials and sends those credentials and other provided strings to a hard-coded, suspicious remote endpoint over plaintext HTTP using a non-standard 'cPython' networking helper. Behavior is consistent with credential exfiltration or unwanted telemetry/backdoor activity. Treat this code as malicious or highly privacy-invasive. Investigate or remove the 'cPython' dependency and block the remote host; do not use in trusted environments.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The code is designed to send sensitive system information to a remote server, which is a significant security risk. This behavior is consistent with malicious activity, specifically data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file gathers environment variables, base64-encodes them, and sends them via an HTTP POST request to events[.]hookdeck[.]com using obfuscated code. The dynamic execution and network exfiltration of potentially sensitive information demonstrate malicious intent.

The fragment is a configuration/payload dataset for offensive tools: automated web scanning/exploitation (SQLi/XSS/admin path brute-force) and multiple DDoS/amplification attack types. While the excerpt has no execution primitives shown, its use in a larger codebase would enable malicious actions or misuse for disruption. Treat this code as hostile/dual-use and avoid including it as a dependency in production systems without strong justification and controls.

The code performs unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive internal project data (package name, version, git commit hash) to a suspicious external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of malicious intent, constituting a supply chain security threat. There is no obfuscation, but the data leak is serious and should be treated as a high-risk security incident.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

The code implements an automated npm package publishing system that generates random package names and versions every 5 seconds, creating potential registry abuse. It hardcodes a placeholder authentication token directly in the source code (process.env.NODE_AUTH_TOKEN = 'your-npm-token'), which poses credential exposure risks if replaced with real tokens. The script continuously overwrites package.json with randomized metadata and executes 'npm publish' via execSync without rate limiting or validation. This behavior can lead to npm registry pollution, violation of npm policies, potential account suspension, and security risks from exposed authentication credentials. While not containing direct malicious payloads or data theft mechanisms, the automated spam-like publishing pattern represents abusive behavior that could disrupt the package ecosystem.

Live on npm for 10 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is high risk for supply-chain use. Its loader pattern (base64 + zlib obfuscation and immediate exec) conceals runtime behavior and enables arbitrary code execution at import time. Treat the package as untrusted until the embedded payload is decoded and audited in a secure, isolated environment. Recommended actions: decode and inspect payload offline, run it in an instrumented sandbox, and block use in production until verified.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by collecting and sending sensitive system data to an unknown external server without user consent.

High risk. The package downloads and installs an executable during npm install and does so while disabling TLS verification (--insecure). This is a supply-chain risk: a malicious or tampered binary could be placed on the system and executed, enabling data exfiltration, remote code execution, reverse shells, or other system compromise. At minimum review the binary before execution, remove or modify the postinstall, or require integrity verification (checksums or signatures) and remove the --insecure flag.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The code is designed to collect and transmit system information to external endpoints without user consent, which is indicative of malicious behavior. The hardcoded endpoints and the nature of the data being sent pose a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 21 hours and 44 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This migration will create a superuser account with predictable, hardcoded credentials ('admin@localhost' / 'admin') whenever the migration is applied. That is a severe security risk (effectively a backdoor) for any environment that runs the migration. No network exfiltration or other malicious payloads were found, but the creation of an easily guessed administrative account warrants urgent remediation: remove or change the RunPython hook, and treat this as a high-risk supply-chain/backdoor indicator.

The code poses a significant security risk and should be reviewed. It is recommended to remove unnecessary imports, verify the contents of the data folder and the WordPress websites before proceeding, and avoid using hardcoded credentials for WordPress login.

Live on npm for 53 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment demonstrates a backdoor-like mechanism: after a password check, it executes an embedded payload via an external interpreter. The use of templated placeholders and a per-build payload means distributed artifacts could silently execute attacker-supplied code. This is a significant supply-chain and runtime risk and warrants aggressive hardening, removal of dynamic code execution paths, or ensuring payloads are strictly controlled and auditable.

This script appears to be checking the operating system and running a PowerShell script on Windows. While this behavior may be intended for legitimate purposes, it is important to review the contents of the PowerShell script to ensure it does not contain any malicious code.

Live on npm for 17 days, 14 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file embeds and dynamically executes compressed/encoded Python payloads via base64 + LZMA and exec(), and uses obfuscated identifiers for subsequent calls. This is a highly suspicious pattern consistent with a loader/dropper or backdoor. Treat this module as high risk: do not run it in production or on sensitive hosts without first decompressing and auditing the payloads in a safe, isolated environment.

This package contains a critical arbitrary code execution vulnerability through unsafe use of exec() on user-controlled input. Any application using this library with untrusted model definitions is at extreme risk of complete system compromise.

The script collects sensitive user information from the Discord API, including usernames, emails, and IDs, and saves it to a file without user consent. It automates interactions with Discord, including sending unsolicited messages to channels (spamming), and uses a captcha solving service to bypass security measures. The script contains hardcoded API keys and tokens, posing significant security risks if shared or leaked. Additionally, it includes obfuscated JavaScript code to manipulate local storage tokens, suggesting attempts to hijack or misuse user accounts.

This module constructs an HTTP Basic Authorization header from provided credentials and sends those credentials and other provided strings to a hard-coded, suspicious remote endpoint over plaintext HTTP using a non-standard 'cPython' networking helper. Behavior is consistent with credential exfiltration or unwanted telemetry/backdoor activity. Treat this code as malicious or highly privacy-invasive. Investigate or remove the 'cPython' dependency and block the remote host; do not use in trusted environments.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The code is designed to send sensitive system information to a remote server, which is a significant security risk. This behavior is consistent with malicious activity, specifically data exfiltration.

Live on npm for 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file gathers environment variables, base64-encodes them, and sends them via an HTTP POST request to events[.]hookdeck[.]com using obfuscated code. The dynamic execution and network exfiltration of potentially sensitive information demonstrate malicious intent.

The fragment is a configuration/payload dataset for offensive tools: automated web scanning/exploitation (SQLi/XSS/admin path brute-force) and multiple DDoS/amplification attack types. While the excerpt has no execution primitives shown, its use in a larger codebase would enable malicious actions or misuse for disruption. Treat this code as hostile/dual-use and avoid including it as a dependency in production systems without strong justification and controls.

The code performs unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive internal project data (package name, version, git commit hash) to a suspicious external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of malicious intent, constituting a supply chain security threat. There is no obfuscation, but the data leak is serious and should be treated as a high-risk security incident.