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This module contains an explicit, high-severity remote code execution vector: it calls eval() on strings reconstructed directly from device-supplied pack.data. If an attacker can control or tamper with device responses (malicious hardware, MitM, or compromised transport), they can execute arbitrary Python in the host process. There are no hard-coded credentials or obfuscated payloads, but the eval usage makes this code unsafe to run in untrusted environments. Immediate remediation: stop using eval on external data, adopt a safe parsing approach (e.g., json.loads) and enforce message integrity/authentication.

The provided source code is performing malicious actions by exfiltrating sensitive system information to a remote server. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This extension contains active malicious behavior. It generates a private wallet, exfiltrates the private key via a widget comm event, and registers a UI command that transfers connected users' tokens and ETH to the generated walletAddress. The design will cause a user who connects their wallet and executes the 'send ocean' command to send value to the extension's generated address. The private key leak means the recipient wallet's secret is exposed to the backend. These are deliberate supply-chain/backdoor patterns and the package should not be used.

The package contains a hidden payload that targets Russian language users visiting Russian and Belarusian sites. For those users, it will disable user interaction and play a looping audio of the Ukrainian anthem after 3 days. Therefore, it is marked as malware only because it freezes interactions for many users. This behavior is not disclosed in any documentation of the package and seriously disrupts user experience.

This appears to be a legitimate Next.js application bundle with standard client-side functionality. The code is heavily minified which limits analysis depth, but observable patterns are consistent with normal Next.js framework behavior. Main concern is potential performance data collection that could be configured to send metrics externally.

The Rust WebSocket server logic is a conventional broadcast-chat relay with no direct evidence of Rust-level malware (no unsafe/FFI/backdoor behavior in the backend). The dominant risks are (1) high-impact static file exposure via `warp::fs::dir(".")`, and (2) the embedded HTML/JS client containing sensitive key/seed-like material and client-side signing/encryption/decryption functionality plus unsafe DOM insertion (`innerHTML`) fed by untrusted relay messages, along with multiple third-party remote script dependencies. Treat this package as security-sensitive and review/remove the embedded client bundle and restrict static file roots before use.

This code fragment implements a remote-control server for an Electron app with the ability to execute arbitrary JavaScript supplied by a remote command (new Function(cmd.js)), capture and transmit full window bitmaps, inject input events, open external URLs, and manipulate the window. Absent strong authentication and strict input validation, this is effectively a backdoor and presents a high supply-chain / runtime risk (data exfiltration and full remote code execution). If this behavior is not explicitly required and properly secured by the application, treat the package as unsafe.

The file contains code that secretly gathers detailed system information, such as hostname, OS type, platform, release, architecture, local IP addresses, public IP address (fetched via an external API), username, and current working directory. It then transmits this data to external endpoints via HTTP GET and POST requests, and uses a WebSocket connection as a fallback. The endpoints are hardcoded, for example, to URLs like http://example.com/jpd3.php, http://example.com/jpd4.php, and wss://example.com/socket, which are not transparent or verified services. This behavior is indicative of malware designed for unauthorized data exfiltration.

The script exposes a local server to the internet and sends the assigned subdomain to an external server at oast.fun. This behavior suggests potential data exfiltration and poses a security risk due to the exposure of local services and communication with an obscure domain.

Live on npm for 45 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a wrapper for Seisan seismic tools and a formatter for STATION0.HYP files. It performs numerous system-level operations: downloading and extracting external software, installing system packages via apt-get with sudo, copying a packaged lib into /usr/lib, and executing external Seisan binaries via pexpect/subprocess. There is no clear code that exfiltrates secrets or establishes backdoors, but the lack of integrity checks on downloads, the requirement for root operations, and frequent shell command usage create substantial supply-chain and privilege escalation risk. Use in environments where the package or its downloaded content could be tampered with is dangerous. Recommend not running download_seisan() with sudo on production hosts and reviewing/locking sources, adding checksum verification, and avoiding copying bundled libraries into system paths.

High-risk supply-chain/security behavior detected: the library includes generic OS command execution helpers (cmd.exe, /bin/bash -c, and arbitrary Process.Start with caller-supplied args). If any of these methods are reachable with untrusted input (directly or indirectly), the package can enable remote code execution, data theft, or exfiltration. Additional issues include potentially unsafe HTML generation and non-cryptographic randomness for security code generation, plus suspicious reflection-based HttpContext access.

This file intentionally conceals and executes an embedded Python payload via base64 decoding and zlib decompression followed by exec(). That pattern prevents static review and is a high-risk supply-chain indicator. Without decoding the payload, the precise behavior is unknown; however the automatic exec on import and absence of provenance make this code unsafe to trust. Immediate action: treat as suspicious, decode the blob in a safe sandbox for full inspection, and avoid running/importing this module in production until the contents are verified.

Live on pypi for 1 day, 16 hours and 51 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code invokes node-telegram-bot-api with a hard-coded bot token (7563340595:AAH4vy1NSEk0vBJY0H4Fcm1fG39cZWzL5-Q) and immediately calls sendMessage to user ID 1855172873, serializing JSON.stringify(process.env). This results in the full set of environment variables—potentially including database credentials, API keys, tokens, and other secrets—being sent over the network to api[.]telegram[.]org without user consent. This is a deliberate credential exfiltration backdoor and poses a high security risk.

The code implements paginated API fetching and aggregates results. Behavior is consistent with legitimate pagination logic, but the heavy obfuscation, inclusion of access_token in query parameters, and absence of validation/error handling are notable risks. Primary risks: potential token leakage via query strings and unsafe following of server-provided paging.next URLs (SSRF/redirect risk). I find no clear signs of active malware in this fragment, but the obfuscation raises supply-chain trust concerns and warrants review of adjacent code and the origin of the access_token and executeFunctions implementation before trusting the package in sensitive contexts.

The code introduces a high-risk pattern: it downloads and immediately executes arbitrary Python code from a remote repository based on user-supplied input, with no validation, authentication, or sandboxing. This constitutes a severe supply chain and remote code execution risk and should be avoided or restricted with strict whitelisting, integrity checks (e.g., code signing or hash verification), and safe execution environments.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior involving data theft and exfiltration. It encodes and sends sensitive system and user data to a suspicious domain via both DNS queries and HTTPS POST requests.

Live on npm for 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains legitimate-notification functions but embeds multiple hardcoded sensitive credentials (Gmail account + app password, several Telegram bot tokens and chat id). That presents a significant supply-chain and credential-exposure risk: if the repository or package is public or reused, attackers can abuse those credentials. I find no clear active malware (no remote shells, no obfuscated payloads, no dynamic code execution), but the hardcoded secrets make this package dangerous to publish or reuse without remediation.

Live on pypi for 112 days, 21 hours and 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment contains a high-risk backdoor mechanism, activated via a script parameter, which decodes and outputs a payload through an obfuscated path. The combination of base64-encoded payload blocks and a dedicated trigger path constitutes a supply-chain-level security risk. Treat as unsound for public distribution; remove or replace with a clean version from the official repository, and perform comprehensive integrity checks (hash verification, SCA/IAST scanning).

No clear evidence of traditional malware (cryptominer, reverse shell, credential harvesting to attacker domain) was found. The module is an obfuscated email verification tool that contacts public provider endpoints and writes validated emails to disk. However it contains a dangerous eval() call that executes JavaScript extracted from an HTTP response (Hotmail/Live flow). That evaluation of remote content is a high-risk pattern (remote code execution) and significantly raises the security risk of using this package, especially in untrusted or network-exposed environments. If you must use this module, remove/replace the eval usage and deobfuscate/inspect the code further; ensure network endpoints are trusted and run in an isolated environment.

Live on npm for 2 days, 4 hours and 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

High-risk malicious installer: the package contains an encrypted, hardcoded payload and key that is decrypted and exec()'d during installation on Windows. This yields arbitrary code execution with the installer's privileges and is a classic supply-chain backdoor pattern. Do not install this package; remove it from build/CI environments and treat any systems where it ran as potentially compromised until further investigation.

This code contains high-risk behavior: it writes a private SSH key and configures a systemd unit that opens a reverse SSH tunnel to a hardcoded remote host (jet@hq.vyomos.org), which effectively provides persistent remote access to the machine. It also installs and enables system services (RabbitMQ) requiring root, and posts registration data to remote APIs. The file appears malformed/partially corrupted which reduces visibility into other potentially dangerous routines. If this reverse tunnel is unexpected for your deployment, treat this as a backdoor and do not run the package. Manual audit of the full/official source repository and verification of package integrity is strongly recommended before use.

The module implements a reverse interactive Python console that provides remote arbitrary code execution and stdout/stderr exfiltration over a TCP connection. It behaves as a backdoor/reverse shell. There is no authentication, authorization, or encryption visible; the console executes received strings in the global context, making it highly dangerous in untrusted environments. The typographical bug when restoring stderr may leave outputs redirected or cause thread errors. Treat this code as high-risk: only allow in tightly controlled, trusted debugging scenarios or remove/restrict it from production dependencies.

Malicious bash initialization script that performs destructive filesystem operations on macOS systems. When the external helper script 'isuserdarwin.sh' returns true, the script silently executes 'sudo rm -rf' to delete critical user directories including ~/Applications, ~/Movies, ~/Music, ~/Pictures, ~/Public, and ~/Sites without user confirmation. It also removes the macOS sleepimage file at /private/var/vm/sleepimage. The script modifies SSH directory permissions using 'sudo chmod -R go-rw' which can break SSH access or expose credentials. All destructive operations have their output suppressed with '>/dev/null 2>&1' to hide failures and make the actions stealthy. The script uses eval to execute the output of /usr/bin/dircolors, creating a command injection risk if the binary is compromised. It depends on external scripts (paper.sh, isuserdarwin.sh, debug.sh) whose contents are unknown and could execute arbitrary code. The destructive operations are embedded within what appears to be routine shell configuration code, likely to disguise the malicious intent.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

This module contains an explicit, high-severity remote code execution vector: it calls eval() on strings reconstructed directly from device-supplied pack.data. If an attacker can control or tamper with device responses (malicious hardware, MitM, or compromised transport), they can execute arbitrary Python in the host process. There are no hard-coded credentials or obfuscated payloads, but the eval usage makes this code unsafe to run in untrusted environments. Immediate remediation: stop using eval on external data, adopt a safe parsing approach (e.g., json.loads) and enforce message integrity/authentication.

The provided source code is performing malicious actions by exfiltrating sensitive system information to a remote server. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This extension contains active malicious behavior. It generates a private wallet, exfiltrates the private key via a widget comm event, and registers a UI command that transfers connected users' tokens and ETH to the generated walletAddress. The design will cause a user who connects their wallet and executes the 'send ocean' command to send value to the extension's generated address. The private key leak means the recipient wallet's secret is exposed to the backend. These are deliberate supply-chain/backdoor patterns and the package should not be used.

The package contains a hidden payload that targets Russian language users visiting Russian and Belarusian sites. For those users, it will disable user interaction and play a looping audio of the Ukrainian anthem after 3 days. Therefore, it is marked as malware only because it freezes interactions for many users. This behavior is not disclosed in any documentation of the package and seriously disrupts user experience.

This appears to be a legitimate Next.js application bundle with standard client-side functionality. The code is heavily minified which limits analysis depth, but observable patterns are consistent with normal Next.js framework behavior. Main concern is potential performance data collection that could be configured to send metrics externally.

The Rust WebSocket server logic is a conventional broadcast-chat relay with no direct evidence of Rust-level malware (no unsafe/FFI/backdoor behavior in the backend). The dominant risks are (1) high-impact static file exposure via `warp::fs::dir(".")`, and (2) the embedded HTML/JS client containing sensitive key/seed-like material and client-side signing/encryption/decryption functionality plus unsafe DOM insertion (`innerHTML`) fed by untrusted relay messages, along with multiple third-party remote script dependencies. Treat this package as security-sensitive and review/remove the embedded client bundle and restrict static file roots before use.

This code fragment implements a remote-control server for an Electron app with the ability to execute arbitrary JavaScript supplied by a remote command (new Function(cmd.js)), capture and transmit full window bitmaps, inject input events, open external URLs, and manipulate the window. Absent strong authentication and strict input validation, this is effectively a backdoor and presents a high supply-chain / runtime risk (data exfiltration and full remote code execution). If this behavior is not explicitly required and properly secured by the application, treat the package as unsafe.

The file contains code that secretly gathers detailed system information, such as hostname, OS type, platform, release, architecture, local IP addresses, public IP address (fetched via an external API), username, and current working directory. It then transmits this data to external endpoints via HTTP GET and POST requests, and uses a WebSocket connection as a fallback. The endpoints are hardcoded, for example, to URLs like http://example.com/jpd3.php, http://example.com/jpd4.php, and wss://example.com/socket, which are not transparent or verified services. This behavior is indicative of malware designed for unauthorized data exfiltration.

The script exposes a local server to the internet and sends the assigned subdomain to an external server at oast.fun. This behavior suggests potential data exfiltration and poses a security risk due to the exposure of local services and communication with an obscure domain.

Live on npm for 45 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is a wrapper for Seisan seismic tools and a formatter for STATION0.HYP files. It performs numerous system-level operations: downloading and extracting external software, installing system packages via apt-get with sudo, copying a packaged lib into /usr/lib, and executing external Seisan binaries via pexpect/subprocess. There is no clear code that exfiltrates secrets or establishes backdoors, but the lack of integrity checks on downloads, the requirement for root operations, and frequent shell command usage create substantial supply-chain and privilege escalation risk. Use in environments where the package or its downloaded content could be tampered with is dangerous. Recommend not running download_seisan() with sudo on production hosts and reviewing/locking sources, adding checksum verification, and avoiding copying bundled libraries into system paths.

High-risk supply-chain/security behavior detected: the library includes generic OS command execution helpers (cmd.exe, /bin/bash -c, and arbitrary Process.Start with caller-supplied args). If any of these methods are reachable with untrusted input (directly or indirectly), the package can enable remote code execution, data theft, or exfiltration. Additional issues include potentially unsafe HTML generation and non-cryptographic randomness for security code generation, plus suspicious reflection-based HttpContext access.

This file intentionally conceals and executes an embedded Python payload via base64 decoding and zlib decompression followed by exec(). That pattern prevents static review and is a high-risk supply-chain indicator. Without decoding the payload, the precise behavior is unknown; however the automatic exec on import and absence of provenance make this code unsafe to trust. Immediate action: treat as suspicious, decode the blob in a safe sandbox for full inspection, and avoid running/importing this module in production until the contents are verified.

Live on pypi for 1 day, 16 hours and 51 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

The code invokes node-telegram-bot-api with a hard-coded bot token (7563340595:AAH4vy1NSEk0vBJY0H4Fcm1fG39cZWzL5-Q) and immediately calls sendMessage to user ID 1855172873, serializing JSON.stringify(process.env). This results in the full set of environment variables—potentially including database credentials, API keys, tokens, and other secrets—being sent over the network to api[.]telegram[.]org without user consent. This is a deliberate credential exfiltration backdoor and poses a high security risk.

The code implements paginated API fetching and aggregates results. Behavior is consistent with legitimate pagination logic, but the heavy obfuscation, inclusion of access_token in query parameters, and absence of validation/error handling are notable risks. Primary risks: potential token leakage via query strings and unsafe following of server-provided paging.next URLs (SSRF/redirect risk). I find no clear signs of active malware in this fragment, but the obfuscation raises supply-chain trust concerns and warrants review of adjacent code and the origin of the access_token and executeFunctions implementation before trusting the package in sensitive contexts.

The code introduces a high-risk pattern: it downloads and immediately executes arbitrary Python code from a remote repository based on user-supplied input, with no validation, authentication, or sandboxing. This constitutes a severe supply chain and remote code execution risk and should be avoided or restricted with strict whitelisting, integrity checks (e.g., code signing or hash verification), and safe execution environments.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior involving data theft and exfiltration. It encodes and sends sensitive system and user data to a suspicious domain via both DNS queries and HTTPS POST requests.

Live on npm for 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains legitimate-notification functions but embeds multiple hardcoded sensitive credentials (Gmail account + app password, several Telegram bot tokens and chat id). That presents a significant supply-chain and credential-exposure risk: if the repository or package is public or reused, attackers can abuse those credentials. I find no clear active malware (no remote shells, no obfuscated payloads, no dynamic code execution), but the hardcoded secrets make this package dangerous to publish or reuse without remediation.

Live on pypi for 112 days, 21 hours and 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment contains a high-risk backdoor mechanism, activated via a script parameter, which decodes and outputs a payload through an obfuscated path. The combination of base64-encoded payload blocks and a dedicated trigger path constitutes a supply-chain-level security risk. Treat as unsound for public distribution; remove or replace with a clean version from the official repository, and perform comprehensive integrity checks (hash verification, SCA/IAST scanning).

No clear evidence of traditional malware (cryptominer, reverse shell, credential harvesting to attacker domain) was found. The module is an obfuscated email verification tool that contacts public provider endpoints and writes validated emails to disk. However it contains a dangerous eval() call that executes JavaScript extracted from an HTTP response (Hotmail/Live flow). That evaluation of remote content is a high-risk pattern (remote code execution) and significantly raises the security risk of using this package, especially in untrusted or network-exposed environments. If you must use this module, remove/replace the eval usage and deobfuscate/inspect the code further; ensure network endpoints are trusted and run in an isolated environment.

Live on npm for 2 days, 4 hours and 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

High-risk malicious installer: the package contains an encrypted, hardcoded payload and key that is decrypted and exec()'d during installation on Windows. This yields arbitrary code execution with the installer's privileges and is a classic supply-chain backdoor pattern. Do not install this package; remove it from build/CI environments and treat any systems where it ran as potentially compromised until further investigation.

This code contains high-risk behavior: it writes a private SSH key and configures a systemd unit that opens a reverse SSH tunnel to a hardcoded remote host (jet@hq.vyomos.org), which effectively provides persistent remote access to the machine. It also installs and enables system services (RabbitMQ) requiring root, and posts registration data to remote APIs. The file appears malformed/partially corrupted which reduces visibility into other potentially dangerous routines. If this reverse tunnel is unexpected for your deployment, treat this as a backdoor and do not run the package. Manual audit of the full/official source repository and verification of package integrity is strongly recommended before use.

The module implements a reverse interactive Python console that provides remote arbitrary code execution and stdout/stderr exfiltration over a TCP connection. It behaves as a backdoor/reverse shell. There is no authentication, authorization, or encryption visible; the console executes received strings in the global context, making it highly dangerous in untrusted environments. The typographical bug when restoring stderr may leave outputs redirected or cause thread errors. Treat this code as high-risk: only allow in tightly controlled, trusted debugging scenarios or remove/restrict it from production dependencies.

Malicious bash initialization script that performs destructive filesystem operations on macOS systems. When the external helper script 'isuserdarwin.sh' returns true, the script silently executes 'sudo rm -rf' to delete critical user directories including ~/Applications, ~/Movies, ~/Music, ~/Pictures, ~/Public, and ~/Sites without user confirmation. It also removes the macOS sleepimage file at /private/var/vm/sleepimage. The script modifies SSH directory permissions using 'sudo chmod -R go-rw' which can break SSH access or expose credentials. All destructive operations have their output suppressed with '>/dev/null 2>&1' to hide failures and make the actions stealthy. The script uses eval to execute the output of /usr/bin/dircolors, creating a command injection risk if the binary is compromised. It depends on external scripts (paper.sh, isuserdarwin.sh, debug.sh) whose contents are unknown and could execute arbitrary code. The destructive operations are embedded within what appears to be routine shell configuration code, likely to disguise the malicious intent.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.