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This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

The code performs unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive internal project data (package name, version, git commit hash) to a suspicious external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of malicious intent, constituting a supply chain security threat. There is no obfuscation, but the data leak is serious and should be treated as a high-risk security incident.

The fragment implements a dynamic injection mechanism around git submodule foreach to route execution through an instrumentation/telemetry pathway (otel.sh) via eval and environment overrides. While it may be legitimate for telemetry, in a supply-chain context this represents a serious risk: it can modify commands, execute external scripts, and potentially exfiltrate data. The code exhibits dynamic execution, environment-based overrides, and obfuscated-like argument handling patterns that are suspicious and likely malicious in user-controlled environments. The automatic aliasing of git further elevates risk by enabling persistence across sessions.

The package contains heavily obfuscated code that interacts with an Ethereum smart contract to retrieve data used in constructing a download URL specific to the user's operating system. Without user consent or validation, the code downloads an executable file from this URL and executes it in the background. This behavior allows for the execution of malicious code on the user's system.

Live on npm for 24 days, 7 hours and 3 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This file is an explicit DNS-based command-and-control transport for the Sliver implant framework. It constructs attacker-controlled DNS queries carrying encoded payloads and performs TXT lookups to receive encrypted commands and blocks. The code facilitates covert data exfiltration and remote code/command delivery. It is malicious by design (implant/C2). Security weaknesses include use of non-cryptographic RNG for IDs/nonces and an unbounded in-memory replay map. Treat this package as malware/C2 infrastructure and avoid running or depending on it unless you have explicit, controlled red-team context.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This file is part of a C2/implant framework (Sliver) and explicitly builds, retrieves, and delivers shellcode and in-memory assemblies to remote implants. Behavior includes generation of payloads, optional encoding, and remote invocation via GenericHandler — all actions that enable unauthorized remote code execution and post-exploitation operations. There are also lower-severity implementation issues (insufficient bounds checking in PE parsing and use of Fatal on parsing errors). If present in a dependency for benign software, this is a severe supply-chain red flag. Use is appropriate only in controlled/authorized contexts.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This code fragment is a configuration/state file for an offensive toolkit: active vulnerability scanning (SQLi/XSS), targeted discovery of admin/upload endpoints, and multiple DoS/flood techniques including reflection/amplification. Although the fragment contains no execution logic, it provides explicit payloads and parameters that enable automated offensive operations when combined with other modules. Treat this package as malicious or at very least highly dangerous/abusive-capable. If you maintain systems, do not run this code; if this is present in a project unexpectedly, investigate source, remove, and audit for other components that perform network actions.

This code implements an unauthenticated HTTP control surface for a viewer object that accepts arbitrary commands from request paths and bodies, dynamically looks up and calls attributes on internal objects, loads JSON from requests and triggers callbacks, and serves local files. These behaviors make it high risk for supply-chain or runtime compromise: untrusted clients can invoke methods and mutate state which could lead to data exfiltration, filesystem access, or other damaging actions depending on the viewer's API. It should not be exposed to untrusted networks or used without strict authentication/authorization and input validation.

This code implements an unauthenticated HTTP control surface for a viewer object that accepts arbitrary commands from request paths and bodies, dynamically looks up and calls attributes on internal objects, loads JSON from requests and triggers callbacks, and serves local files. These behaviors make it high risk for supply-chain or runtime compromise: untrusted clients can invoke methods and mutate state which could lead to data exfiltration, filesystem access, or other damaging actions depending on the viewer's API. It should not be exposed to untrusted networks or used without strict authentication/authorization and input validation.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

This assembly contains a heavily obfuscated loader/packer component that reads encrypted embedded resources, decrypts them using symmetric/asymmetric crypto, resolves native APIs at runtime, allocates and writes memory, and installs runtime hooks/delegates — patterns consistent with an in-memory code loader / reflective injector. Combined with the control-flow obfuscation and native memory writes, this is high-risk for supply-chain or runtime code injection/malware. Treat this package as malicious or potentially dangerous: do not run in production or on sensitive hosts. If you must use any code from this package, perform a full, dynamic, and offline forensic analysis in a safe sandbox and remove the obfuscated loader component.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This library may pose a security risk if not properly configured and validated. Careful review and configuration are recommended before using it in a production environment. This library may pose a security risk if not properly configured and validated. Careful review and configuration are recommended before using it in a production environment.

Live on npm for 9 hours and 41 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Possible typosquat of [react-tabulator](https://socket.dev/npm/package/react-tabulator) Explanation: The package name 'slack-reacjilator' appears to have been designed to deceive by mimicking the structure of 'react-tabulator', even though the semantic components ("slack" vs "react-tabulator") suggest different intended integrations. The modification (‘reacjilator’ instead of a similar term) follows adversarial tactics such as 1-step letter substitution and compound squatting, so it is flagged as an adversarial name. Because the name is crafted to trick users rather than indicate a straightforward fork (no clear username affiliation) and the intended functionality does not appear to be distinct (the naming strongly suggests impersonation), we consider it as not having a distinct purpose and not a fork. Additionally, the package holds a suspicious description stating “security holding package” and its sole maintainer is listed as ‘npm’, which in this context is treated with suspicion. Hence, we conclude that this package exhibits characteristics of a typosquat with suspicious intent. Risk level: High).

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

The code performs unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive internal project data (package name, version, git commit hash) to a suspicious external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of malicious intent, constituting a supply chain security threat. There is no obfuscation, but the data leak is serious and should be treated as a high-risk security incident.

The fragment implements a dynamic injection mechanism around git submodule foreach to route execution through an instrumentation/telemetry pathway (otel.sh) via eval and environment overrides. While it may be legitimate for telemetry, in a supply-chain context this represents a serious risk: it can modify commands, execute external scripts, and potentially exfiltrate data. The code exhibits dynamic execution, environment-based overrides, and obfuscated-like argument handling patterns that are suspicious and likely malicious in user-controlled environments. The automatic aliasing of git further elevates risk by enabling persistence across sessions.

The package contains heavily obfuscated code that interacts with an Ethereum smart contract to retrieve data used in constructing a download URL specific to the user's operating system. Without user consent or validation, the code downloads an executable file from this URL and executes it in the background. This behavior allows for the execution of malicious code on the user's system.

Live on npm for 24 days, 7 hours and 3 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This file is an explicit DNS-based command-and-control transport for the Sliver implant framework. It constructs attacker-controlled DNS queries carrying encoded payloads and performs TXT lookups to receive encrypted commands and blocks. The code facilitates covert data exfiltration and remote code/command delivery. It is malicious by design (implant/C2). Security weaknesses include use of non-cryptographic RNG for IDs/nonces and an unbounded in-memory replay map. Treat this package as malware/C2 infrastructure and avoid running or depending on it unless you have explicit, controlled red-team context.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

This file is part of a C2/implant framework (Sliver) and explicitly builds, retrieves, and delivers shellcode and in-memory assemblies to remote implants. Behavior includes generation of payloads, optional encoding, and remote invocation via GenericHandler — all actions that enable unauthorized remote code execution and post-exploitation operations. There are also lower-severity implementation issues (insufficient bounds checking in PE parsing and use of Fatal on parsing errors). If present in a dependency for benign software, this is a severe supply-chain red flag. Use is appropriate only in controlled/authorized contexts.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This code fragment is a configuration/state file for an offensive toolkit: active vulnerability scanning (SQLi/XSS), targeted discovery of admin/upload endpoints, and multiple DoS/flood techniques including reflection/amplification. Although the fragment contains no execution logic, it provides explicit payloads and parameters that enable automated offensive operations when combined with other modules. Treat this package as malicious or at very least highly dangerous/abusive-capable. If you maintain systems, do not run this code; if this is present in a project unexpectedly, investigate source, remove, and audit for other components that perform network actions.

This code implements an unauthenticated HTTP control surface for a viewer object that accepts arbitrary commands from request paths and bodies, dynamically looks up and calls attributes on internal objects, loads JSON from requests and triggers callbacks, and serves local files. These behaviors make it high risk for supply-chain or runtime compromise: untrusted clients can invoke methods and mutate state which could lead to data exfiltration, filesystem access, or other damaging actions depending on the viewer's API. It should not be exposed to untrusted networks or used without strict authentication/authorization and input validation.

This code implements an unauthenticated HTTP control surface for a viewer object that accepts arbitrary commands from request paths and bodies, dynamically looks up and calls attributes on internal objects, loads JSON from requests and triggers callbacks, and serves local files. These behaviors make it high risk for supply-chain or runtime compromise: untrusted clients can invoke methods and mutate state which could lead to data exfiltration, filesystem access, or other damaging actions depending on the viewer's API. It should not be exposed to untrusted networks or used without strict authentication/authorization and input validation.

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

This assembly contains a heavily obfuscated loader/packer component that reads encrypted embedded resources, decrypts them using symmetric/asymmetric crypto, resolves native APIs at runtime, allocates and writes memory, and installs runtime hooks/delegates — patterns consistent with an in-memory code loader / reflective injector. Combined with the control-flow obfuscation and native memory writes, this is high-risk for supply-chain or runtime code injection/malware. Treat this package as malicious or potentially dangerous: do not run in production or on sensitive hosts. If you must use any code from this package, perform a full, dynamic, and offline forensic analysis in a safe sandbox and remove the obfuscated loader component.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This library may pose a security risk if not properly configured and validated. Careful review and configuration are recommended before using it in a production environment. This library may pose a security risk if not properly configured and validated. Careful review and configuration are recommended before using it in a production environment.

Live on npm for 9 hours and 41 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Possible typosquat of [react-tabulator](https://socket.dev/npm/package/react-tabulator) Explanation: The package name 'slack-reacjilator' appears to have been designed to deceive by mimicking the structure of 'react-tabulator', even though the semantic components ("slack" vs "react-tabulator") suggest different intended integrations. The modification (‘reacjilator’ instead of a similar term) follows adversarial tactics such as 1-step letter substitution and compound squatting, so it is flagged as an adversarial name. Because the name is crafted to trick users rather than indicate a straightforward fork (no clear username affiliation) and the intended functionality does not appear to be distinct (the naming strongly suggests impersonation), we consider it as not having a distinct purpose and not a fork. Additionally, the package holds a suspicious description stating “security holding package” and its sole maintainer is listed as ‘npm’, which in this context is treated with suspicion. Hence, we conclude that this package exhibits characteristics of a typosquat with suspicious intent. Risk level: High).

This VS Code extension is classified as **malware** because it exhibits **high-confidence brandjacking and typosquatting** indicators that strongly imply deceptive distribution and user impersonation: * **Publisher impersonation:** The VSIX claims to be “JFrog VSCode Extension,” but it is published by **`Artifactory-Software-Studio`**, not the official **JFrog** publisher. * **Typosquatted identifier:** The extension’s identity is **`vscode-jrrog-extension`** (note the **“jrrog”** typo), which is a look-alike of the official JFrog extension identifier and consistent with marketplace typosquat tactics. * **Abuse of trust via branding:** The manifest and package metadata deliberately reuse **JFrog’s brand name** (“JFrog VSCode Extension”) to induce installation under false provenance. * **High-risk capability overlap:** The extension’s functionality includes **reading JFrog CLI configuration/credentials** and initiating **outbound network connections** for scanning workflows. In a typosquatted/impersonating package, these capabilities materially increase the likelihood of credential theft or sensitive project metadata leakage, regardless of whether the current bundle contains overt C2 logic. Together, the **deceptive provenance** (non-official publisher + typo-lookalike ID + brand reuse) is sufficient to classify the extension as malicious because it is designed to obtain installs by masquerading as a trusted vendor extension, a common precursor to credential harvesting and supply-chain compromise.